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THE ANTIDEMOCRATIC SIXTH AMENDMENT
Janet Moore *
Abstract: Criminal procedure experts often claim that poor people have no Sixth
Amendment right to choose their criminal defense lawyers. These experts insist that the
Supreme Court has reserved the Sixth Amendment right to choose for the small minority of
defendants who can afford to hire counsel. This Article upends that conventional wisdom
with new doctrinal, theoretical, and practical arguments supporting a Sixth Amendment right
to choose for all defendants, including the overwhelming majority who are indigent. The
Article’s fresh case analysis shows the Supreme Court’s “no-choice” statements are dicta,
which the Court’s own reasoning and rulings refute. The Article’s new theoretical framework
exposes the “no-choice” stance as an antidemocratic concentration of judicial power, which
blocks pressure from poor people to strengthen the right to counsel. Finally, the Article
addresses practical objections to an equal right of attorney choice with innovative strategies
that promote meaningful choice for all defendants.
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INTRODUCTION
Criminal procedure experts often claim that poor people have no
Sixth Amendment right to choose their criminal defense lawyers. 1 These
experts insist that the Supreme Court has reserved the Sixth Amendment
right to choose counsel for the small minority of defendants who can
afford to hire their lawyers. 2 The Court itself has made the same claim. 3

1. See, e.g., RONALD JAY ALLEN ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: ADJUDICATION AND RIGHT TO
COUNSEL 277–86 (11th ed. 2011) (discussing Sixth Amendment right to choose for those who “can
afford an attorney” or recruit pro bono help (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140
(2006) and Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983))); STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA,
AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 1478 (10th ed. 2014) (“The Supreme
Court has held that so long as an indigent receives effective representation, he has no right to choose
a particular counsel” (citing Slappy, 461 U.S. 1)); see also YALE KAMISAR ET AL., ADVANCED
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 121 (13th ed. 2012) (“[A] defendant
may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford . . . . “ (citing Wheat v. United
States, 486 U.S. 153, 202 (1988))).
2. See, e.g., SALTZBURG & CAPRA, supra note 1.
3. See, e.g., Luis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1089 (2016) (“[A]n indigent
defendant, while entitled to adequate representation, has no right to have the Government pay for
his preferred representational choice” (internal citation omitted)); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez,
548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006) (“We have previously held that an element of this right is the right of a
defendant who does not require appointed counsel to choose who will represent him.” (emphasis
added) (internal citation omitted)). But see infra section II.A (showing that the Supreme Court’s
anti-choice statements are dicta). The Court also has indicated that defendants who can recruit pro
bono counsel may have a Sixth Amendment right to choose. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 144. This
Article focuses on disparate application of the Sixth Amendment right to choose based on ability to
hire counsel because recruitment of pro bono counsel is relatively rare. See, e.g., Douglas A.
Berman, Professor Mark Osler’s Informed Perspective on Recent Federal Clemency Developments,
SENTENCING L. & POL’Y BLOG (June 4, 2015), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_
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This Article shows that those claims are mistaken and offers new
arguments supporting a Sixth Amendment right to choose for all
defendants—including the overwhelming majority who are indigent 4
and who are disproportionately people of color. 5
These new arguments answer a blunt question that Chief Justice John
Roberts asked during oral argument on the Sixth Amendment right to
choose. On hearing that indigent defendants have no right to choose their
lawyers, the Chief Justice asked, “Why not?” 6 The correct answer is that
there is no good reason to discriminate against poor people in the
vindication of this fundamental constitutional right. To the contrary,
such de jure discrimination is antidemocratic. It concentrates judicial
power and blocks pressure from poor people to improve the quality,
fairness, and legitimacy of criminal legal systems as well as the content
of constitutional law.
Chief Justice Roberts did not receive that answer during oral
argument because the Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel is
understudied by scholars, undertheorized by courts, and underutilized by
advocates of criminal justice reform. This Article fills the gap with new
doctrinal, theoretical, and practical analysis that shows why it is
important to include poor people in the right to choose counsel.
The argument unfolds as follows. Since the Sixth Amendment right to
choose is understudied and undertheorized, Part I explains how judges
discriminate against poor people in vindicating the right to choose
counsel and how this de jure discrimination is antidemocratic. This Part
applies the author’s democracy-enhancing framework for criminal law
and procedure, 7 which moves beyond dominant justifications for

law_and_policy/2015/06/professor-mark-oslers-informed-perspective-on-recent-federal-clemencydevelopments.html [http://perma.cc/6N5H-CJFQ].
4. See, e.g., CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
SPECIAL REPORT: DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES 1 (2000), http://www.bjs.gov/index.
cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=772 [http://perma.cc/54XC-TNMS] (estimating that eighty-two percent of
criminal defendants facing felony charges cannot afford to hire counsel).
5. See KATHLEEN SHORT, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE SUPPLEMENTAL POVERTY MEASURE:
2014 1–2 (2015) (defining poverty metrics); id. at 5, tbl.2 (documenting disproportionate poverty
rates for Black and Hispanic populations).
6. Transcript of Oral Argument at 34, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006) (No.
05-352).
7. See Janet Moore, Democracy Enhancement in Criminal Law and Procedure, 2014 UTAH L.
REV. 543, 563–72; cf. Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123
YALE L.J. 1889, 1893 (2014) (reframing federalism in terms of promoting “a well-functioning
national democracy”).
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criminal law (utilitarian-retributive), 8 for criminal procedure (due
process-crime control), 9 and for the right to choose counsel (libertarianfree market). 10 The democracy-enhancing approach focuses on whether
and how criminal legal policies reduce reliance on incarceration by
promoting equal capacities for individual and communal selfgovernance. 11 This mode of analysis focuses particularly on the
capacities of poor people and people of color who have
disproportionately high contact with crime and criminal legal systems,
but little voice in generating and administering the governing law. 12
This new democracy-enhancing framework exposes the “no-choice”
stance as one that denigrates the agency and silences the individual and
collective voices of poor people and people of color. Conversely, this
framework reveals the right to choose counsel as a mode of grassroots
lawmaking that frees the overwhelming majority of defendants to press
for improvements in the governing law. This transformation can occur as
more defendants demand better information about key performance
indicators for quality defense service. Those indicators include
independence from funders and judges, resource parity with the
prosecution, and enforcement of best-practice standards for attorney
qualification, workload and performance. 13
Transparency begets accountability. 14 More defendants making more
informed choices raises pressure to improve prevailing standards for
attorney performance. Significantly, those same standards define the
substantive meaning of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel under

8. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 14–23 (6th ed. 2012) (discussing
distinction between retributivism’s focus on moral desert, and utilitarianism’s focus on promoting
social benefits and reducing social costs).
9. See HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 149–74 (1968) (discussing
distinction between the due process focus on fairness and the crime-control focus on harm
reduction).
10. See, e.g., Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D. Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense:
Promoting Effective Representation Through Consumer Sovereignty and Freedom of Choice for All
Criminal Defendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 109–10 (1993) (combining libertarian focus on
individual autonomy with free-market analysis).
11. See Moore, supra note 7.
12. See id. at 545–63; Jocelyn Simonson, The Criminal Court Audience in a Post-Trial World,
127 HARV. L. REV. 2174, 2185–89 (2014).
13. See infra Part I.
14. At least under conditions posited here. See Jonathan Fox, The Uncertain Relationship
Between Transparency and Accountability, 17 DEV. IN PRAC. 663, 667–69 (2007). I thank Jennifer
Laurin for insights on the application of these concepts in the context of public defense reform. See
Jennifer E. Laurin, Data and Accountability in Indigent Defense, 14 OH. ST. J. CRIM. L.
(forthcoming 2017).
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Strickland v. Washington. 15 Strickland’s laissez-faire approach to
attorney performance has kept prevailing attorney performance
standards low. 16 By pressing to improve those standards, poor people
and people of color can contribute, collectively and over time, to
strengthening the substantive meaning of this fundamental constitutional
right. 17
Thus, the new democracy-enhancing framework for the Sixth
Amendment right to choose has significant practical implications. Yet
the Sixth Amendment right to choose has been underutilized by criminal
justice reform advocates. Therefore, this Article offers additional support
for an inclusive right to choose that benefits all defendants. Parts II and
III offer new doctrinal analysis that supports the indigent defendant’s
right to choose counsel. Part II shows that the Supreme Court’s
discriminatory “no-choice-for-the-poor” statements are dicta, which the
Court’s own rulings and reasoning refute. Part III uncovers new tension
over the “no-choice” rule in state courts and lower federal courts, which
litigators and policy advocates can exploit.
Part IV supplements these doctrinal discoveries with practical
strategies to make an inclusive right of counsel choice meaningful.
These strategies include client-rights and client-feedback protocols as
well as community organizing techniques that can reduce the opacity of
the legal market and promote more informed attorney choice. This
Article concludes that reform advocates should use these new doctrinal,
theoretical, and practical arguments to replace “no-choice”
discrimination with an inclusive right of counsel choice that applies
equally to all defendants.
I.

THE ANTIDEMOCRATIC SIXTH AMENDMENT

Part I lays a foundation for the doctrinal and practical analysis that
follows. Section I.A explains how judges discriminate against poor
people in vindicating the right to choose counsel. Sections I.B–D explain
how this de jure discrimination is antidemocratic—that is, how it
concentrates judicial power and blocks pressure by poor people to
strengthen the right to counsel. Section I.E explains how these problems
undermine system legitimacy.
15. 466 U.S. 664, 687 (1984); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366–67 (2010).
16. See infra notes 60–68 and accompanying text.
17. Cf. Cecelia Klingele, Editor’s Observations: Vindicating the Right to Counsel, 25 FED.
SENT’G REP. 87, 90 & nn.32–33 (2012) (discussing how line attorneys can reshape meaning of
Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
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The Double Standard

This section explains how judges discriminate against poor people in
vindicating the right to choose counsel. The analysis begins with the
constitutional text. The Sixth Amendment secures a criminal defendant
“the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” 18 The
Supreme Court has held that the right to counsel is a “fundamental”
constitutional guarantee 19 because it is “necessary to insure . . . life and
liberty.” 20 Therefore, the Court has held, a defendant cannot be
incarcerated for any conviction unless he or she either receives the
assistance of counsel or waives the right to a lawyer.21 This fundamental
right applies to the minority of defendants who can hire lawyers as well
as to the majority who need government-paid counsel because they
cannot afford an attorney. 22
The minority of defendants who can afford to hire counsel have a
Sixth Amendment right to hire any lawyer who is willing to take the
case. 23 However, the right to hire counsel of choice is subject to several
important limitations. Those limitations include forfeiture laws, which
empower governments to seize resources that can be traced to criminal
activity and that defendants would otherwise use to pay their chosen
counsel. 24
Another important limitation on the right to hire counsel of choice is
the ability of trial judges to override that choice. 25 Several circumstances
can justify such overrides. 26 Trial judges may deem a chosen lawyer to
be unqualified to handle the case, unavailable to proceed in a timely
manner without disrupting the court’s docket, or unable to cure a conflict

18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
19. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986).
20. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938).
21. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658−59 (2002) (right applies to any case involving
incarceration, including misdemeanors resulting in subsequently revoked probation); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339−41, 345 (1963) (right incorporated against the states in felony cases
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Zerbst, 304 U.S. at 467−68 (absent a
knowing and voluntary waiver, “failure to complete the court” by providing counsel for indigent
defendants violates the Sixth Amendment and divests federal courts of jurisdiction).
22. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 345; HARLOW, supra note 4.
23. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 144 (2006).
24. See infra section II.A.3.
25. See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 151–52.
26. Id.
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of interest. 27 Thus, the right to hire counsel of choice is confined to
lawyers who are qualified, available, and conflict-free. 28
If a trial judge deems a defendant’s chosen lawyer to be unqualified,
unavailable, or conflicted, the judge can require the defendant to proceed
with alternate counsel. If the defendant is required to proceed with
alternate counsel and the case ends in a conviction, the defendant may
raise the counsel-choice issue on appeal as a basis for obtaining a new
trial. 29 To prevail on that claim, the defendant must prove that the trial
court abused its discretion in overriding the defendant’s choice of hired
counsel. 30
The abuse-of-discretion standard is difficult to meet. The standard
requires deference to a trial judge’s assessment of fact-intensive
matters, 31 such as whether a particular lawyer is sufficiently qualified,
available, and conflict-free to handle a particular case. That deference is
based on the trial judge’s superior “feel of the case[,] which no
appellate . . . transcript can impart.” 32
These substantive and procedural limitations on the Sixth Amendment
right of counsel choice are significant. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
has defined the right to choose an attorney as the “root meaning” of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 33 The Court excavated that “root
meaning” in United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez. 34 The case is noteworthy
for several reasons.
First, the prosecution conceded in Gonzalez-Lopez that the judge
erred in overriding the defendant’s choice of counsel.35 In other words,
the prosecution conceded that the defendant’s chosen lawyer should
have been allowed to represent the defendant at trial because that lawyer
was qualified, available, and free from conflicts of interest. 36 That
concession lifted a heavy burden of proof from the defendant’s
shoulders.

27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. Id. at 152.
31. See Henry J. Friendly, Indiscretion About Discretion, 31 EMORY L.J. 747, 759–61 (1982).
32. Cone v. West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 216 (1947) (quoted in Friendly,
supra note 31, at 761.
33. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147–49.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 152.
36. See id.
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Because the prosecution conceded that the trial judge violated the
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel, the only issue in
Gonzalez-Lopez was the standard of review that appellate courts should
use to evaluate such an error. 37 Typically, prosecutors must prove that
constitutional errors are harmless—that is, that the errors did not affect
the outcome of the trial—in order to win a case on appeal. 38 In
Gonzalez-Lopez, however, Justice Scalia authored a 5-4 majority opinion
that rejected harmless-error review. 39 Instead, the Court held that denial
of a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel is
structural error. 40
Application of the structural error standard to the right of counsel
choice is significant because, under that standard, appellate courts may
not ask whether a trial judge’s override of counsel choice affected the
case outcome. 41 Regardless of the strength of the case, or how well the
trial lawyer performed, reversal is automatic and the conviction must be
vacated. 42
It is also important to note that structural error is the most appellantfriendly standard of review and applies only to a tiny set of
constitutional claims. 43 Such claims encompass violations of the right to
an indictment by a grand jury selected without racial bias,44 the rights to
an impartial judge 45 and a public trial, 46 and the right to accurate jury
instructions on reasonable doubt. 47 Violations of these rights are of
“the rare type” that “infect the entire trial process . . . and necessarily
render [it] fundamentally unfair.” 48
Gonzalez-Lopez is therefore noteworthy because the case ushered the
Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel into an elite pantheon of
constitutional errors that are structural and require automatic reversal.
Equally significant, however, are the Court’s statements that poor people

37. See id. at 148.
38. See Glebe v. Frost, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 429, 430 (2014).
39. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 142, 150, 152.
40. Id. at 150–51.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 146–48, 149 n.4.
44. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 262–63 (1986).
45. United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 263 (2010).
46. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 49 n.9 (1984).
47. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993).
48. Glebe v. Frost, __ U.S. __ ,135 S. Ct. 429, 430 (2014) (quoting Neder v. United States, 527
U.S. 1, 8 (1999) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
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have “no right to choose” their criminal defense lawyers,49 and therefore
cannot benefit from the same generous standard of review enjoyed by
defendants who can afford to hire counsel. The Court’s “no-choice-forthe-poor” statements are dicta, 50 but lower courts and commentators
misconstrue them as settled law. 51
When lower courts apply the “no-choice-for-the-poor” stance as
settled law, trial judges have final authority to appoint defense lawyers
for poor people who face criminal charges. 52 Even if an indigent
defendant finds a lawyer who is qualified, available, and free from
conflicts of interest—in other words, if the indigent defendant satisfies
the same criteria for vindicating the right to choose counsel that apply to
defendants who can hire counsel—the indigent defendant nevertheless
has no Sixth Amendment right to choose that lawyer. 53
Instead, the indigent defendant must prove to the trial judge that there
is an irreconcilable conflict or total breakdown of communication with
the court-appointed lawyer, which will prevent that lawyer from
presenting an adequate defense. 54 Nor will appellate courts reverse a
subsequent conviction for structural error if they determine that the trial
judge wrongly forced the indigent defendant to proceed with the
unwanted lawyer. 55 Instead, the indigent defendant must meet a far more
onerous test, which the Supreme Court established in Strickland v.
Washington. 56
Understanding the antidemocratic effects of this de jure double
standard requires a brief explanation of Strickland and how that case
defines the substantive meaning of the right to counsel. Section I.B
provides that explanation.

49. See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 784 (2009) (citing United States v. GonzalezLopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006)).
50. See infra section II.A.
51. See supra note 1; infra Part III.
52. See infra section I.C.
53. See infra Part III. State and lower federal courts have applied the “no-choice” constitutional
rule to trump counsel choice by indigent defendants even when local rules or statutes allow
defendants to substitute counsel. See, e.g, United States v. Davis, 604 F.2d 474, 479 (7th Cir. 1979)
(distinguishing 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(c), which grants judicial discretion to approve requests for
substitute counsel “in the interests of justice”); State v. Jones, 797 N.W.2d 378, 391–92, 392 n.17
(Wis. 2010) (applying similar reasoning to WIS. ADMIN. CODE PD § 2.04 (2016)).
54. See Jones, 797 N.W.2d at 390–91.
55. Id. at 394–95.
56. Id. at 381 (citing United States v. Mutuc, 349 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2003)); see Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
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Strickland and the Meaning of the Right to Counsel

In Strickland v. Washington, the Court established a two-part
definition of what it means “to have the Assistance of Counsel.” 57 To
overturn a conviction or sentence under Strickland, a defendant must
prove two things. First, the defendant must prove that his or her lawyer
acted unreasonably in light of prevailing attorney performance
standards. 58 Second, the defendant must show a reasonable possibility
that this substandard performance hurt the defendant’s case. 59
Significantly, the first prong of the Strickland test bakes real-world
attorney practices into the substantive definition of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. 60 Those real-world practices include
promulgation of formal guidelines for attorney performance, which
address core duties to communicate, investigate, and advocate.61 Courts
often use those guidelines to assess the reasonableness of a lawyer’s
performance when a defendant claims that the lawyer’s constitutional
ineffectiveness requires a new trial or sentencing hearing. 62
Unfortunately, the gap between formal attorney performance
guidelines and real-world practice is immense. 63 Strickland’s
performance-and-prejudice test is maligned for giving free passes to
drunk, sleeping, lazy, and overworked lawyers. 64 Less a constitutional
floor than a leaky, sewage-filled basement, the first prong of the test
requires strong judicial deference to possible (and sometimes fanciful)
strategic reasons for challenged attorney conduct. 65 Examples include

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

466 U.S. at 685 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI); id. at 687 (setting standard).
Id. at 687.
Id.
See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366–67 (2010).
See id. at 367 (citing examples).
Id.
See generally NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE
DENIED: AMERICA’S CONTINUING NEGLECT OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL (2009),
http://www.constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf [http://perma.cc/3NGS-3EPM] [hereinafter JUSTICE
DENIED] (urging reform); see also Gary Feldon & Tara Beech, Unpacking the First Prong of the
Strickland Standard: How to Identify Controlling Precedent and Determine Prevailing Professional
Norms in Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Cases, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 15–24 (2012)
(proposing method for identifying prevailing professional norms).
64. See Janet Moore, Marla Sandys & Raj Jayadev, Make Them Hear You: Participatory Defense
and the Struggle for Criminal Justice Reform, 78 ALB. L. REV. 1281, 1295 (2015).
65. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see, e.g., Scanlon v. Harkleroad, 740 F.
Supp. 2d 706, 728−30 (M.D.N.C. 2010), aff’d per curiam, 467 F. App’x 164 (4th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 164 (2012) (finding trial counsel ineffective in guilt/innocence phase, but denying
defendant new trial). The author represented Petitioner Donald Scanlon in state and federal
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the “strategic” decision not to investigate and present evidence of actual
innocence in the guilt/innocence phase of a capital case. 66
Thus, defendants have an extremely difficult burden in attempting to
satisfy Strickland. An abundant literature documents the costs of that
burden, including an ongoing crisis of overloaded, underfunded, lowquality public defense service. 67 That scholarship is not re-canvassed
here. There is wide agreement, however, that Strickland contributes to
the indigent defense crisis with abysmally low constitutional standards
for defense attorney performance. 68
But Strickland has a narrow escape hatch—at least for certain
defendants who have the means to hire counsel. As discussed above, for
those defendants, violation of their right to choose a specific lawyer
requires structural error review. 69 Appellate courts may not inquire into
the quality of substitute counsel’s performance or whether it hurt the
defendant’s case. 70 Reversal is automatic. 71 The Strickland escape hatch
is therefore a significant procedural benefit, which the “no-choice-forthe-poor” stance restricts to the minority of defendants who can hire
counsel.
Blocking poor people from Strickland’s escape hatch is perverse for
several reasons. De jure discrimination in the vindication of a
fundamental constitutional right violates equal protection and due
process guarantees. 72 That discrimination also makes the Sixth
Amendment antidemocratic.
Those antidemocratic effects are manifest in three ways. First, the
discriminatory “no-choice-for-the-poor” stance blocks pressure from
poor people and people of color to strengthen the right to counsel.
Second, that stance concentrates unchecked judicial power. Finally, that
stance undermines the legitimacy of criminal legal systems. Each of
these problems is explained more fully below. For current purposes, it is
important to summarize how abolishing that discrimination can increase

appellate and post-conviction challenges to his convictions and death sentence. Scanlon, 740 F.
Supp. 2d at 708.
66. Scanlon, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 728−30.
67. See, e.g., JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 63.
68. See, e.g., id. at 38–43, 212–13 (urging reform).
69. See supra section I.A (discussing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150−51
(2006)).
70. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150–51.
71. Id.
72. See infra section II.B.
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pressure to improve both attorney performance and the substantive
meaning of the right to counsel.
Extending the right of counsel choice to poor people encourages more
defendants to demand information about attorney performance, to use
that information to choose better-performing lawyers, and, through the
collective influence of those choices, to pressure more lawyers to
provide better performance. Since Strickland bakes real-world
performance standards into the substantive definition of the right to
counsel, improving those performance standards should gradually
strengthen the meaning of the right.
History demonstrates that such pressure can be effective. Past
improvements in real-world performance standards have trickled up to
redefine and strengthen the right to counsel under Strickland. Those
improvements, and the resulting substantive redefinition of “assistance
of counsel,” were driven primarily by elites, however, and not by
indigent defendants. Wiggins v. Smith 73 is a leading example. In that
case, pressure to improve standards of performance came from a
changing zeitgeist among leaders in the capital defense bar. 74
Wiggins raised the question whether capital defense lawyers met
Strickland’s substantive definition of “assistance” of counsel. To answer
that question, the Court followed Strickland and compared counsel’s
performance with local and national standards for capital defense
representation. 75 The Court concluded that the decision to truncate a
mitigation investigation in a capital case must itself be informed by an
objectively reasonable investigation. 76 In other words, capital defense
lawyers cannot make objectively reasonable decisions about evidence
they never bother to investigate. 77 The Court concluded that counsel had
failed to meet that standard, and vacated the death sentence.78
The Court decided Wiggins amidst a “cataclysmic” shift in
performance standards for capital defense. 79 Those standards were
moving from an “unwise and unsound and . . . increasingly obsolete”
focus on obtaining acquittals in the guilt/innocence phase to a new norm

73. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
74. David R. Dow, Bell v. Cone: The Fatal Consequences of Incomplete Failure, in DEATH
PENALTY STORIES 395 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009).
75. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 524–25, 534.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Id. at 538.
79. See Dow, supra note 74, at 395.
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under which “mitigation [is] a mainstay.” 80 Wiggins therefore
demonstrates that the substantive meaning of the right to counsel can
change over time as the Court incorporates improvements in prevailing
attorney performance standards into the two-part Strickland test. 81
Wiggins also illustrates how change in the substantive meaning of the
Sixth Amendment right to “assistance of counsel” occurs dialogically.
As reformed practice standards elevate the constitutional floor, new
training programs are designed and implemented to bring more
practitioners up to that new performance level. 82 Unfortunately, Wiggins
also demonstrates the rate of that change has been excruciatingly slow
and its scope minimal. Indeed, it should shock the uninitiated reader to
realize that a Supreme Court ruling was necessary to establish the
constitutional duty of capital defense counsel to investigate readilyavailable evidence that could save a client’s life. It should be equally
concerning that the Court established the constitutional duty to
investigate mitigation evidence nearly twenty years before Wiggins was
decided—in Strickland v. Washington. 83
The pace of this constitutional change could quicken, and its limited
scope could expand, if courts stop discriminating against the
overwhelming majority of defendants who are indigent with respect to
the Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel. Moreover, excluding that
majority from the right of counsel choice concentrates virtually
unreviewable power in the judiciary. Understanding these
antidemocratic aspects of the “no-choice-for-the-poor” stance requires a
more thorough explanation of existing mechanisms for connecting
indigent defendants with lawyers. Section I.C provides that explanation.
C.

The Problem of Judicial Appointments

Judges have final responsibility for appointing lawyers to represent
indigent defendants. 84 They fulfill that responsibility by drawing from a

80. Id.
81. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374–75 (2010), marked a similar seismic shift in the
substantive meaning of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Strickland by requiring defense
attorneys to inform clients of deportation consequences connected to plea offers.
82. See Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 316 (2011).
83. 466 U.S. 664, 675–76, 691, 699 (1984).
84. See, e.g., James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make?
The Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 YALE L.J. 154, 191–93 (2012)
(discussing process in Philadelphia).
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list or pool of available attorneys. 85 Those attorneys may work in public
defender offices or in private practice. 86 Defense lawyers in private
practice may accept indigent clients on a case-by-case basis or take
batches of cases under flat-fee contracts. 87 When judges appoint lawyers
in any of these categories, they may exercise discretion based on the
same concerns about attorney qualification, availability, and conflicts of
interest that limit a defendant’s choice of retained counsel. 88
Thus, regardless of the particular mix of service providers in a given
jurisdiction, by necessity criminal legal systems across the country have
preexisting infrastructures for identifying lawyers who are available to
take criminal cases. As discussed more fully below, those infrastructures
can be adapted to accommodate counsel choice by indigent defendants.89
Indeed, longstanding experience in England and other countries
demonstrate that administrability is a relatively minor hurdle to
implementing an inclusive right of counsel choice that applies equally to
all defendants. 90 A recent experiment with counsel choice for indigents
in Texas tends to corroborate that point. 91 The program is ongoing as
social scientists evaluate the results of initial implementation, which was
recently completed with support from a state grant and revealed that “a
substantial majority of defendants . . . preferred to select their own
lawyers rather than have the court appoint lawyers for them.” 92
These facts are important because the judicial appointment of counsel
for indigent defendants raises a number of problems. For one thing, the
“no-choice-for-the-poor” stance gives judges virtually unreviewable

85. See id.
86. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 63, at 82–84.
87. See id.
88. See, e.g., Rachel Dissell, Conflicts and ‘Candy Lists’: Debates Continue Between County
Judges, Defense Attorneys and Prosecutor Over Indigent Case Assignments, CLEVELAND PLAIN
DEALER (Dec. 14, 2014, 7:06 PM), http://www.cleveland.com/courtjustice/index.ssf/2014/12/
conflicts_and_candy_lists_deba.html [http://perma.cc/KA54-3RPD] (discussing factors affecting
judicial appointments).
89. See infra Part IV.
90. See Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideon’s Promise: Lessons from England and the Need
for Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 873 (2004).
91. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Client Choice for Indigent Criminal Defendants: Theory and
Implementation, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 505, 544–56 (2015); Email from Norman Lefstein, Dean
Emeritus and Professor, Indiana University—Robert H. McKinney School of Law, to Janet Moore,
Associate Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law (Nov. 19, 2016, 6:33 PM) (on
file with author) (describing project as “successfully implemented”).
92. Email from Norman Lefstein, supra note 91; see also Email from Jim Bethke, Executive
Director, Texas Indigent Defense Commission, to Janet Moore, Associate Professor of Law,
University of Cincinnati College of Law (Oct. 26, 2016, 10:14 AM) (on file with author).
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authority in making defendant-lawyer matches. Concerns about such
unchecked judicial power are embodied in the American Bar
Association’s Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System. 93
The Ten Principles have been described as “essential” for evaluating
the effectiveness of indigent defense systems. 94 The first of these
essential principals is political independence of the defense function. 95
Independence promotes zealous advocacy by raising a firewall between
the funding authority and the lawyer. 96 That firewall protects lawyers
from inevitable pressure to please (or avoid irritating) people with
ultimate power over their paychecks. 97 Thus, the first of the Ten
Principles requires severing the link between judges and attorney
appointments. 98
This requirement is mediated in some jurisdictions when judges
appoint the local public defender who then assigns a staff attorney or
private lawyer to take the case. 99 Other jurisdictions keep the
appointment authority inside the courthouse, but strive for greater
neutrality by distributing appointments randomly through a court
administrator. 100
Unfortunately, appointment processes in too many jurisdictions lack
oversight and accountability. 101 Moreover, judges retain authority to
trump counsel assignments made by a local public defender or court
administrator based on their own independent assessments of counsel’s
qualifications, availability, or potential conflict of interest.102 In addition,
some appointment processes are tainted by pay-to-play conflicts and
low-bid contracts, in which judges distribute cases in exchange for
93. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A
PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 1–2 (2002), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf
[http://perma.cc/3CJQ-KTCW] [hereinafter TEN PRINCIPLES].
94. Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Keynote Address at the American
Bar
Association’s
National Summit
on
Indigent
Defense
(Feb.
4,
2012),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-eric-holder-speaks-american-bar-association-snational-summit-indigent [http://perma.cc/3SMH-Q255] [hereinafter Holder, Keynote Address]
(discussing the importance of the Ten Principles).
95. TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 93, at 2.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See Dissell, supra note 88.
100. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 63, at 82 (discussing random assignment procedures available
in Texas).
101. See id. at 82–84.
102. See, e.g., Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1983).
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campaign contributions or other concessions from defense lawyers.103
Such quid pro quo arrangements pressure lawyers to dial back their
advocacy toward “meet-’em-and-plead-’em” case processing 104 as part
of the local “courtroom work group” culture. 105 As the Texas State Bar
reported,
Unlike prosecutors, court-appointed defense attorneys have no
easy access to investigators, experts, or witnesses. In many
cases, they are not given enough time or money to do a good
job. Many court-appointed lawyers feel pressured to back off
from aggressively representing their clients out of fear that their
efforts will go unpaid or that they will be removed from the list
of attorneys doing such cases. 106
Such tainted decision making results when concentrated power
operates without transparency and accountability. Courts concentrate
their own power, and reduce transparency and accountability, by
excluding poor people from exercising the same Sixth Amendment right
to attorney choice that is enjoyed by defendants who have the means to
hire counsel. Viewing attorney choice as a democracy-enhancing
mechanism reveals its potential to check that concentrated power and to
operate as a form of grassroots lawmaking. Section I.D explains the
latter potential more fully.
D.

Counsel Choice and Democracy Enhancement

Including poor people in the right to choose counsel serves a
democracy-enhancing function on multiple levels in addition to checking
concentrated judicial power. Inclusive attorney choice can force greater
transparency from what currently are very opaque systems. Inclusive
attorney choice also increases pressure to improve standards of attorney
performance. As courts incorporate those improved standards into the
governing law, inclusive attorney choice can strengthen the substantive

103. Id.; see also Dissell, supra note 88.
104. Steven B. Bright, The Past and Future of the Right to an Attorney for Poor People Accused
of Crimes, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE FUTURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 14 (John T.
Parry & L. Song Richardson, eds., 2013) (describing “meet ’em and plead ’em” case processing).
105. See, e.g., NICOLE GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN
AMERICA’S LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT xiii–xiv, 3–6, 21–32 (2016) (describing degrading effects
of “courtroom work group” culture).
106. Jeff Blackburn & Andrea Marsh, The New Performance Guidelines in Criminal Cases: A
Step Forward for Texas Criminal Justice, 74 TEX. B.J. 616, 617 (2011), https://www.texasbar.com/
AM/Template.cfm?Section=Texas_Bar_Journal&Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=
14703 [https://perma.cc/JK7L-N5UD].
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meaning of the right to counsel. Finally, inclusive attorney choice can
improve system legitimacy. This subsection focuses on the how an
inclusive right of counsel choice can enhance democracy by improving
information flow, raising pressure to improve counsel performance, and
strengthening the substantive meaning of “assistance of counsel.”
1.

Improving Information Flow

Meaningful attorney choice requires defender systems to disclose
information on their own structures as well as on the lawyers who
operate within those structures. 107 System quality and attorney quality
are separate issues. Defendants need information on both.
Information on system quality includes levels of system compliance
with the American Bar Association’s Ten Principles, including the
political independence of the defense function. 108 Thus, defendants
should know who is making important decisions about the quality of
their legal services. Optimally, those decisions would be made by a
broad-based, state-wide commission that is not beholden to any branch
of government. 109 Alternatives devolve too easily, as legislators push
low-bid contracts and judges appoint pay-to-play lawyers in exchange
for campaign contributions 110 or perfunctory, go-along-to-get-along
advocacy. 111
According to the Ten Principles, the independent commission is more
likely than the alternatives to promote both higher-quality defense
service and greater system efficiency. 112 Expanding the number of
defendants who are able to exercise constitutionally-protected choice of
counsel should force systems to self-disclose more of this information.
System administrators can do so easily and at little cost through existing
websites, intake forms, and other media.
Meaningful choice also requires information on the existence and
enforcement of standards for attorney qualification, training,

107. See Jennifer E. Laurin, Gideon by the Numbers: The Emergence of Evidence-Based Practice
in Indigent Defense, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 325, 334–36 (2015); Janet Moore, Indigent Defense
Attorney Toolbox, U. OF CIN. (Mar. 7, 2016), http://guides.libraries.uc.edu/c.php?g=222533&p=
1473687 [https://perma.cc/8222-E5HA]. It took the author and research assistants three years to
compile this electronic multijurisdictional standards dataset, with the goal of creating a real-time,
publicly accessible standards website.
108. TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 93.
109. JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 63, at 185–91.
110. See Dissell, supra note 88; JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 63, at 80–84.
111. See Blackburn & Marsh, supra note 106.
112. See TEN PRINCIPLES, supra note 93.
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performance, and workload. 113 The existence and enforcement of such
standards will turn in part on the degree to which systems provide
resource parity between prosecutors and defenders, which is another
important factor in evaluating quality defense representation. 114 Other
important standards include the ABA’s guidelines on excessive defender
workloads 115 and the same organization’s Formal Ethics Opinion 06441. 116 Those standards are designed to prevent lawyers from taking or
keeping cases when their workloads impede competent, diligent
representation. 117 “Competence” and “diligence” comprise the core
duties to communicate, investigate, and advocate. 118
Thus, indigent defendants should know whether counsel’s failure to
communicate or investigate—the two counsel-related problems most
frequently reported by people facing criminal charges 119—indicate
structural flaws such as excessive caseloads and inadequate funding,
training, and oversight. Defendants who know the governing standards
and avenues for their enforcement are better positioned to identify and
respond effectively to substandard performance, both in managing their
own specific cases and in organizing support for system reform. 120 An
equal right to choice of counsel will increase the number of defendants
113. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 367 (2010) (citing sources of formal standards). For
examples of state-level standards, see Blackburn & Marsh, supra note 106, at 620–37, and NORTH
CAROLINA COMM’N ON INDIGENT DEF. SERVS, PERFORMANCE GUIDELINES FOR INDIGENT DEFENSE
REPRESENTATION IN NON-CAPITAL CRIMINAL CASES AT THE TRIAL LEVEL 1–2 (Nov. 12, 2004),
http://www.ncids.org/Rules%20&%20Procedures/Performance%20Guidelines/Trial%20Level%20F
inal%20Performance%20Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/P6ZU-ALRH].
114. See Ronald F. Wright, Parity of Resources for Defense Counsel and the Reach of Public
Choice Theory, 90 IOWA L. REV. 219, 263–68 (2004) (discussing the need for parity in resources for
case investigation, evidence testing, expert testimony, and attorney hours to support constitutionally
effective representation).
115. EIGHT GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE RELATED TO EXCESSIVE WORKLOADS, AM. BAR
ASS’N STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS (2009), http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_eight_guide
lines_of_public_defense.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/8LUD-MNBU] [hereinafter Eight
Guidelines].
116. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (May 13, 2006),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclai
d_def_ethics_opinion_defender_caseloads_06_441.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q2E9D46U].
117. See id.
118. Id.
119. See Christopher C. Campbell, Janet Moore, Wesley Maier & Mike Gaffney, Unnoticed,
Untapped, and Underappreciated: Clients’ Perceptions of their Public Defenders, 33 BEHAV. SCI.
& L. 751, 759–61 (2015) (discussing quantitative analysis); id. at 761–64 (discussing focus group
results).
120. See Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1309–15.
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seeking such information, and push systems toward greater transparency
and accountability.
2.

Attorney Choice and Grassroots Lawmaking

The foregoing discussion underscores how including poor people in
the right of attorney choice can raise pressure for systems to provide
defendants with more and better information to empower better decision
making in the exercise of that right. This Article claims such
transparency as a democracy-enhancing function of the expanded
constitutional right. The same democracy-enhancement framework
enriches the dominant narrative surrounding that right. In that dominant
narrative, constitutionally-protected attorney choice protects the
autonomous individual’s purchase of services in the free market as a
check on governmental threats to life, liberty, and property. 121
The democracy-enhancement framework extends the analysis from
the market to the commons. That shift reveals the right’s potential as a
mode of grassroots lawmaking that can check concentrated government
power while strengthening the substantive meaning of the constitutional
right to counsel. Thus, the Sixth Amendment right to choose can be
more than an anomalous constitutional right to shop—a right that is, by
definition, reserved for those who can afford the price of entry. Instead,
to borrow a phrase from Professor Heather Gerken, including poor
people in the exercise of this right should speed “the democratic churn
necessary for an ossified national system to move forward.” 122
This is so because an inclusive counsel-choice rule that applies to all
defendants instead of a small minority can exponentially increase
pressure to improve attorney performance standards. To date, that
pressure has been created primarily by elites and has proved minimally
effective. Freeing the majority of indigent defendants to exercise the
right of counsel choice should increase that pressure. As discussed
above, inclusive choice should force greater self-disclosure of
information about system and attorney quality. That information should
increase the number of defendants who request representation from
better-performing lawyers. Those patterns of choice should encourage
better standards of attorney performance. In the aggregate and over time,
that grassroots pressure should raise expectations—including judicial

121. See, e.g., Kaley v. United States, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1105 (2014) (Roberts, C.J.,
Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting); Schulhofer, supra note 91.
122. Heather K. Gerken, The Supreme Court 2009 Term—Foreword: Federalism All the Way
Down, 124 HARV. L. REV. 4, 10 (2010).
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expectations—for the level of performance that can be deemed
“reasonable” as a matter of constitutional law.
In the longer term, a stronger defense function may help to rebalance
criminal legal systems set askew by the widely acknowledged and
historically unprecedented concentration of power in the prosecutorial
function. 123 Factors contributing to this imbalance of power include
expansive criminal codes, virtually unchecked prosecutorial charging
discretion, and imposition of higher punishment as a trial tax on
defendants who refuse plea offers. 124 These factors have helped to
degrade many criminal legal systems into the plea mills 125 and debtor’s
prisons 126 that feed hyperincarceration 127 and undermine system
legitimacy, 128 particularly for the low-income people and people of color
who are disproportionately enmeshed in these systems. 129
Thus, vindicating the Sixth Amendment right to choose for all
defendants can provide a number of benefits. Those benefits include a
democracy-enhancing function that can operate on multiple levels.
Ultimately, inclusive choice may help to shore up the meaning and value
of cognate rights that are guaranteed to criminal defendants and are in a
state of decline correlative to increasing concentration of prosecutorial
power. 130 Those enfeebled guarantees include the prosecutor’s due

123. See, e.g., Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After
Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2155–60 (2013).
124. See id. Notably, concern over these developments spans the ideological spectrum. Cf. Alex
Altman, Koch Brother Teams Up with Liberals on Criminal Justice Reform, TIME (Jan. 29, 2015),
http://time.com/3686797/charles-koch-criminal-justice/ [https://perma.cc/ZPT3-P4NW].
125. See, e.g., Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1124 (W.D. Wash. 2013);
Michelle Alexander, Opinion, Go to Trial: Crash the Justice System, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/opinion/sunday/go-to-trial-crash-the-justice-system.html
[https://perma.cc/NK6P-U3H2] (discussing analysis of criminal justice reform advocate Susan
Burton).
126. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-253 (E.D. Mo. Feb.
2, 2015); Joseph Shapiro, In Ferguson, Court Fines and Fees Fuel Anger, NPR (Aug. 25, 2014),
http://www.npr.org/2014/08/25/343143937/in-ferguson-court-fines-and-fees-fuel-anger
[http://perma.cc/PS79-2CZS].
127. See Moore, supra note 7, at 553–54 & nn.61–62 (discussing distinction between mass
incarceration and hyperincarcation) (citing Loïc Wacquant, Class, Race and Hyperincarceration in
Revanchist America, 139 DAEDALUS 74, 78–79 (2010)); see also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
314–16 (Jeremy Travis, Bruce Western & Steve Redburn eds., 2014) [hereinafter NRC REPORT].
128. See generally Campbell et al., supra note 119, at 754–55.
129. See Moore, supra note 7, at nn.37–42.
130. See id. at nn.70–76.
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process duty to disclose information beneficial to the defense 131 and the
Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. 132 Their continued decline is a
threat to liberty and warrants prompt intervention.
Courts have aborted these potential benefits of an inclusive right to
choose counsel. They have done so by imposing a discriminatory double
standard that excludes the overwhelming majority of defendants from
exercising agency at a pivotal point in their cases. Such participation can
improve not only the content of the governing law, but also the
legitimacy of the systems through which that law is created and
administered. Both badly need shoring up.
E.

Counsel Choice and Legitimacy

Democracy deficits have undermined the legitimacy of U.S. criminal
legal systems to the point of rendering the term “criminal justice”
oxymoronic or utopian. 133 People who experience crime and carceral
policies—whether as victims, witnesses, offenders or, as is often the
case, in overlapping roles—are disproportionately poor people and
people of color who have little voice in generating and administering the
governing law. 134 Excluding poor people from the Sixth Amendment
right to choose counsel deepens that silence and compounds those
democracy deficits.
These democracy deficits are not new. 135 Periodically, however,
public and sometimes violent protest focuses fresh attention on the roles
of race and socioeconomic class in the formation and implementation of
criminal justice policies. 136 Indeed, the episodic development of the
indigent defendant’s right to government-paid counsel coincided with
such protests. 137
131. See Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform After Connick and Garcetti,
77 BROOK. L. REV. 1329, 1329–30 (2012).
132. See, e.g., Daniel Givelber, Punishing Protestations of Innocence: Denying Responsibility
and Its Consequences, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1363, 1399–400 (2000).
133. See Moore, supra note 7, at 548–63; Anthony Bottoms & Justice Tankebe, Beyond
Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice, 102 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 119, 125–26 (2012) (defining legitimacy as the “necessarily conditional or
defeasible” dialogic relationship involving “positive recognition by citizens of the powerholder’s
moral right to exercise that power”) (emphases in original).
134. See Moore, supra note 7, at 548–49.
135. See id. at 560–62.
136. See, e.g., Yamiche Alcindor, Civil Rights Leaders at Odds as Ferguson Protests Grow, USA
TODAY (Dec. 28, 2014, 4:01 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/12/28/asferguson-protest-grows-so-do-tensions/20664395/ [https://perma.cc/ZL2F-UB6E].
137. Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1291–96.
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Bursts of Supreme Court activity have occurred during periods of
heightened national and international controversy over racialized
socioeconomic inequalities in the United States and their disparate
impact on criminal proceedings. 138 Those periods, in the 1930s, 1960s,
and early twenty-first century, have been marked by embarrassment over
what historian John Hope Franklin described as the nation’s broken
“promise of real equality.” 139
In the 1930s, international scrutiny and public protest surrounded
litigation of Powell v. Alabama, 140 which constitutionalized the right to
capital defense counsel. 141 During the Civil Rights era of the 1950s and
1960s, similar scrutiny and protest surrounded the generation of the right
to government-paid counsel in felony trials and in criminal appeals. 142
Twenty-first century embarrassments include the degeneration of
criminal legal systems into the plea mills and debtor’s prisons that feed
racially disparate patterns of hyperincarceration. 143 As in the earlier
periods, public protest and heightened international attention have been
accompanied by expansions of the right to counsel. 144
It is important to note another key aspect of this doctrinal history.
From its inception, the indigent defendant’s right to government-paid
counsel has comprised an idiosyncratic federal constitutional mandate to
distribute resources from haves to have-nots. 145 That mandate derives
from equal protection and due process principles as well as the Sixth
Amendment text and related case law.146 The right to government-paid
defense counsel is therefore an exception to what Professor Julie Nice
describes as the effective deconstitutionalization of poverty law. 147
138. Id. For a more recent example of such international attention, see Sam Fulwood, Race and
Beyond: Putin Should Not Throw Stones (Sept. 30, 2015), https://www.americanprogress.
org/issues/race/news/2015/09/30/122391/putin-should-not-throw-stones/ [https://perma.cc/G8MTNTUN] (discussing President Vladimir Putin’s deflecting questions about democracy in Russia by
pointing to policing practices in Ferguson, Missouri).
139. See Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1291–96; JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, DEMOCRACY
BETRAYED: THE WILMINGTON RACE RIOT OF 1898 AND ITS LEGACY xi–xii (David S. Cecelski &
Timothy B. Tyson eds., 1998).
140. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
141. See Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1291–93.
142. Id. at 1293–94.
143. See supra notes 125–29.
144. See Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1294–96.
145. See Janet Moore, G Forces: Gideon v. Wainwright and Matthew Adler’s Move Beyond CostBenefit Analysis, 11 SEATTLE J. SOC. J.1025, 1051–58 (2013).
146. See Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1291–96.
147. Julie A. Nice, No Scrutiny Whatsoever: Deconstitutionalization of Poverty Law, Dual Rules
of Law, & Dialogic Default, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629, 629–36 (2008).
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This brief account locates the Court’s overtly discriminatory “nochoice-for-the-poor” statements within a doctrinal history that reflects
the contested role and meaning of equality as a constitutional norm. 148
That contestation includes repeated moments of geopoliticized
embarrassment 149 over this country’s distinctive intersection of race,
poverty, and carceral policies. To be sure, it is no doubt true that
“[e]quitable treatment was an underlying concern” as the Court sought
“to reduce the disadvantages of poverty in litigation” by developing the
right to government-paid counsel. 150 It is no doubt equally true,
however, that those judicial motives have been mixed. 151
The fragility of those mixed motives is reflected in the weak
definition and enforcement of the indigent defendant’s right to counsel
under Strickland, the resulting ongoing crisis of overloaded,
underfunded, low-quality public defense service, and the role of that
crisis in the wider upheaval over U.S. carceral policies.152 Public
concern is further piqued by unprecedented, budget-busting levels of
hyperincarceration 153 and economic inequality. 154 News headlines
trumpet disparities and unfairness in grand jury charging 155 as well as in
other criminal legal processes and outcomes. 156 Predictable responses

148. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 7, at 558–63, 575–86.
149. See supra notes 136–44 and accompanying text.
150. Darryl K. Brown, The Warren Court, Criminal Procedure Reform, and Retributive
Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1411, 1424 (2002) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 344 (1963)).
151. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 5 (2004); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Racial Realism, in THE
LEGAL STUDIES READER: A CONVERSATION & READINGS ABOUT THE LAW 250, 253 (George
Wright & Maria Stalzer Wyan Cuzzo eds., 2004); Stephen M. Feldman, Do the Right Thing:
Understanding the Interest-Convergence Thesis, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 248, 250–52 (2012)
(discussing Professor Bell’s interest-convergence and racial-realism theories).
152. See supra sections I.B–D.
153. See supra note 123127 and accompanying text.
154. See Moore, supra note 7, at 548–49 & nn.37–38; see also THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 23–26, 246–50, 291–304 (Arthur Goldhammer trans., 2014)
(discussing patterns).
155. See, e.g., Maria Gallucci, Tamir Rice Shooting: Protesters Call for Cleveland Prosecutor to
Resign After Grand Jury Declines to Indict Officers, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2016),
http://www.ibtimes.com/tamir-rice-shooting-protesters-call-cleveland-prosecutor-resign-aftergrand-jury-2246699 [https://perma.cc/5QVT-AFS5]; James Pinkerton, Bulletproof, Part 3: Hard to
Charge, HOUS. CHRON. (2013), http://www.houstonchronicle.com/local/investigations/item/
Bulletproof-Part-3-Hard-to-charge-24421.php [https://perma.cc/25V9-R542] (discussing an
investigation that raises questions about whether the grand jury system in Harris County favors the
police).
156. See supra notes 125–29.
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include more task forces issuing another round of reports. 157 History
indicates that such responses will have minimal impact on the resilient
interlocking set of networked institutions and policies that comprise the
carceral state. 158
Breaking this Sisyphean cycle requires a new analytical framework.
The dominant theories of criminal law (retributive/utilitarian), criminal
procedure (due process/crime control), and constitutionally-protected
attorney choice (libertarian-free market) 159 are inadequate to support
meaningful or sustainable criminal justice reform. The democracyenhancing approach offers an alternative. 160
Viewed from a democracy-enhancement perspective, overt judicial
discrimination in the vindication of the Sixth Amendment right to
choose counsel concentrates judicial power and prevents grassroots
lawmaking. The same de jure discrimination also undermines system
legitimacy by denigrating the agency and silencing the voices of poor
people, who are disproportionately people of color. Indeed, some judges
expressly justify excluding poor people from the right of attorney choice
by claiming to have greater expertise in evaluating attorney qualification
and performance than indigent defendants. 161 But as Dean Norman
Lefstein notes, there is no reason to think that indigent defendants in the
United States are less savvy than those in England and other common
law countries, which trust poor people to choose their own lawyers
instead of forcing them into arranged matches.162
Moreover, claims of superior judicial expertise in evaluating counsel
performance denigrate the agency of poor people and people of color by

157. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13684, 79 Fed. Reg. 76865 (Dec. 18, 2014); cf. NRC REPORT,
supra note 127; NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NAT’L
ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 11 (1968); OHIO COMM’N ON RACIAL FAIRNESS, REPORT
OF THE OHIO COMMISSION ON RACIAL FAIRNESS 36–56 (1999).
158. See, e.g., MARIE GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF
AMERICAN POLITICS (2014) (discussing the interlocking, resilient structures that compose the
carceral state and render it resistant to reform); cf. Utah v. Strieff, __U.S.__, 136 S. Ct. 2056,
2070−71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (interpreting majority’s construction of Fourth
Amendment as “impl[ying] that you are not a citizen of a democracy but the subject of a carceral
state, just waiting to be cataloged”).
159. Moore, supra note 7, at 550, 563–69; see also supra notes 8–10.
160. Moore, supra note 7, at 550, 563–69.
161. See, e.g., Drumgo v. Superior Court of Marin Cty., 506 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Cal. 1973)
(justifying denial of a capital murder defendant’s request for appointment of an available, qualified,
conflict-free lawyer despite appointed counsel’s request to be removed from the case due to lack of
experience because “the court knew [appointed counsel] to be competent [and that] he had
previously served as court appointed counsel”).
162. See Lefstein, supra note 90, at 918–20.
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reinforcing stereotypes of their dependence, irrationality, and
incapacity. 163 It is precisely because these communities have
disproportionate contact with crime and criminal legal systems that they
are well-positioned to assess defense performance. 164 The participatory
defense movement exemplifies that expertise. 165
Participatory defense is a social justice movement that applies
community organizing strategies to improve public defense. 166 The
movement shows that the collective wisdom of the community can
outstrip that of court personnel when it comes to evaluating (and
demanding) quality defense. 167 Other research tends to corroborate this
point. Indeed, when empirical researchers bother to ask indigent
defendants what they think about their lawyers, the evidence shows a
good deal of sophistication (as well as some surprising empathy) in
those assessments. 168
The few other proffered justifications for the “no-choice” stance are
also more reflexive than reasoned. 169 For example, judges have warned
of delays if untrammeled choice “allow[s] a popular attorney to have the
courts marking time to serve his convenience.” 170 But the constitutional
right to choose counsel does not include lawyers with full dance cards.
An equal right of counsel choice limits the choices of all defendants to
lawyers who are available to resolve cases within timelines established
through the court’s calendaring authority. 171
More often than not, judges simply adopt the “no-choice” stance with
no justification whatsoever. That is, they state summarily that indigents
are entitled to constitutionally effective assistance and nothing more. 172
Professor Wayne Holly translates such assertions into an underlying
premise that “beggars can’t be choosers.” 173 Professor Holly counters
163. Cf. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES 105–
06 (3d ed. 2015) (discussing processes of social stratification).
164. Moore, supra note 7, at 548–49.
165. Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1281–91.
166. Id. at 1282–83.
167. Id. at 1281–91.
168. See id. at 1309–14; Campbell et al., supra note 119.
169. See Wayne D. Holly, Rethinking the Sixth Amendment for the Indigent Criminal Defendant:
Do Reimbursement Statutes Support Recognition of a Right to Counsel of Choice for the Indigent?,
64 BROOK. L. REV. 181, 201 (1998).
170. See, e.g., People v. Dowell, 266 P. 807, 809 (Cal. 1928).
171. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006) (citing Morris v. Slappy, 461
U.S. 1 (1983)).
172. See Drumgo v. Superior Court of Marin Cty., 506 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Cal. 1973).
173. Holly, supra note 169, at 182–83.
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that most indigent defendants should have constitutionally-protected
attorney choice because they do have skin in the game; they pay for
counsel through contribution and recoupment procedures. 174
Other scholars have argued against the “no-choice” stance based on
equal protection, 175 promotion of attorney-client trust and individual
autonomy, 176 and market efficiencies as clients “drive out” bad lawyers
by rewarding the good. 177Such arguments led The New York Times to
promote attorney choice for all defendants,178 and encouraged the Texas
Indigent Defense Commission to test what appears to be the nation’s
first attorney-choice program for poor people in a single rural county. 179
The scholarly arguments against the “no-choice” stance are well
taken, and the Texas experiment is worth watching. 180 Nevertheless,
prior arguments for an inclusive right to attorney choice have missed a
bigger payoff. The Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel has strong
democracy-enhancing potential. Including poor people in the right to
choose counsel fulfills core constitutional values by promoting equal
participation in the generation and administration of law. 181 As a mode
of grassroots lawmaking, attorney choice promotes transparency and
accountability while checking concentrated judicial and executive power
and improving system legitimacy.
Unfortunately, a discriminatory double standard infects the right of
counsel choice. That discrimination results primarily from a widespread
misimpression that the Supreme Court has established as a matter of law
that indigent defendants have no Sixth Amendment right to choose
counsel. 182 Part II’s fresh scrutiny of the case law exposes those “nochoice” statements as dicta. The analysis also shows how those dicta

174. Id. at 218–24.
175. Peter W. Tague, An Indigent’s Right to the Attorney of His Choice, 27 STAN. L. REV. 73, 87–
89 (1974).
176. See, e.g., Hoeffel, supra note 224, at 541–45. Professor Hoeffel argues for the narrower right
to continue a relationship with an appointed lawyer. Id.
177. See Schulhofer & Friedman, supra note 10.
178. Adam Liptak, Need-Blind Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/01/05/sunday-review/need-blind-justice.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/3X2D-S93L].
179. Id.; see also supra notes 91–92. A recent census of Comal County, the site of the Texas
attorney-choice experiment, reports the population of 108,000 is 69.5% white and 26.2% LatinoHispanic with median household income of $65,839 and a poverty rate of 10.2%. See State &
County Quickfacts Comal County Report, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 5, 2015),
http://quickfacts.census.gov/ qfd/states/48/48091.html [http://perma.cc/SS2V-2JVN].
180. But see infra Part IV (discussing problems with the Texas project).
181. See Moore, supra note 7, at 563–65.
182. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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have distracted courts and commentators from reasoning and rulings in
the same Supreme Court cases that strongly support a right of counsel
choice for all defendants. The analysis offers tools for advocates to
dismantle the “no-choice” rule and end de jure discrimination against
poor people in the vindication of this fundamental constitutional right.
II.

DEMOCRATIZING COUNSEL CHOICE: A NEW LOOK AT
SUPREME COURT CASE LAW

This Part corrects the widespread misunderstanding that Supreme
Court statements excluding poor people from constitutionally-protected
attorney choice are holdings. Section II.A shows that those “no-choice”
statements are dicta belied by the Court’s own reasoning and rulings,
including due process and equal protection doctrines discussed in section
II.B.
A.

The Court’s Discriminatory Dicta

There are three Supreme Court cases that courts and commentators
cite most frequently when asserting that people who require
government-paid counsel are categorically excluded from exercising the
Sixth Amendment right to attorney choice that is enjoyed by those with
means to hire counsel. In chronological order by date of decision, those
cases are Wheat v. United States, 183 Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States, 184 and United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez. 185 The first two
decisions, Wheat and Caplin, rejected right-to-choose claims and
restricted the right’s application. 186
Only the third of these frequently-cited cases, Gonzalez-Lopez,
vindicated the right to choose through structural error review. 187 More
recently, however, in Luis v. United States 188 the Court followed
Gonzalez-Lopez and held that the defendant had a Sixth Amendment
right to access $2 million in assets that were “untainted” by an alleged
$45 million criminal conspiracy in order to hire her chosen counsel. 189

183. 486 U.S. 153 (1988); see KAMISAR, ET AL., supra note 1 (citing Wheat).
184. 491 U.S. 617 (1989). Caplin was issued on the same day, and with a similar holding and
reasoning as a companion case, United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
185. 548 U.S. 140 (2006); see ALLEN ET AL., supra note 1 (citing Gonzalez-Lopez).
186. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164; Caplin, 491 U.S. at 617.
187. 548 U.S. at 150.
188. __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016).
189. Id. at 1087–88.
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All four of these cases were hotly contested; each was decided by the
narrowest possible one-vote margin. 190 The four cases share two other
key characteristics. First, each recites the “no-choice-for-the-poor”
mantra. 191 Second, none of the defendants were indigent. Each had
ample means to hire counsel. 192
Statements in these Supreme Court cases that dismiss the indigent
defendant’s right to choose are therefore dicta. 193 Similar “no-choice”
dicta appear in three other important Supreme Court cases that do
involve indigent defendants and the exercise of choice in the
appointment of counsel. Those cases are Faretta v. California, 194 Morris
v. Slappy, 195 and Montejo v. Louisiana. 196
This Part provides an integrated analysis of these seven cases. The
analysis supports three conclusions. First, the Court’s statements
excluding poor people from constitutionally protected attorney choice
have limited precedential value. Second, the Court’s own limitations on
the Sixth Amendment right to choose answer some of the most
significant practical concerns about vindicating the right for poor people.
The cases allow judges to override attorney choice if the lawyer is
unqualified, unavailable, unwilling, or has a conflict of interest. 197 These
restrictions make it unlikely that current methods for connecting
defendants with attorneys would be overwhelmed by a rule protecting
the right to attorney choice for indigent defendants as well as those who
can afford to hire counsel.
Third, previously unnoticed subtexts in Faretta and Montejo provide
additional grounds for supporting a right of counsel choice that applies
to indigent defendants as well as to those who can afford to hire counsel.
190. See Luis, 136 S. Ct. at 1087; Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152–53; Caplin, 491 U.S. at 634–
36; Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164–65, 172.
191. Luis, 136 S. Ct. at 1093 (plurality opinion); id. at 1102 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1110
(Kennedy & Alito, JJ., dissenting); Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 152–53; Caplin, 491 U.S. at 624;
Wheat, 486 U.S. at 158–59.
192. Luis, 136 S. Ct. at 1087–88; Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 142; Caplin, 491 U.S. at 620–21;
Wheat, 486 U.S. at 155.
193. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953, 960–
61 (2005) (reasoning that an issue must be “actually decided . . . based upon the facts of the case” to
qualify as a holding); Judith M. Stinson, Teaching the Holding/Dictum Distinction, 19
PERSPECTIVES: TEACHING LEGAL RES. & WRITING 192 (2011) (“[M]ost typically ‘holding’ is
defined as that portion of a legal opinion that is ‘necessary to the result.’”).
194. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
195. 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
196. 556 U.S. 778 (2008).
197. See, e.g., Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164 (holding that a court can deny counsel choice to prevent
conflict of interest).
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Faretta shows that an inclusive right to choose counsel can increase
perceptions of system legitimacy while saving time and money. 198
Montejo emphasizes the importance of indigent defendants’ choices
about legal representation, even when counsel is automatically
appointed. 199 These new insights into Faretta and Montejo bookend the
case analysis below.
1.

The Right of Forced Refusal: Faretta’s Untold Story

Faretta v. California might seem odd support for an inclusive right to
choose counsel, since the case created the right to refuse counsel. 200 The
case came to the Supreme Court because Anthony Faretta thought he
could do a better job defending himself than his public defender, who he
alleged was overworked, 201 biased, and conflicted. 202 The trial judge
refused to allow Faretta to represent himself and kept the public
defender on the case. 203 The jury heard strong evidence of Faretta’s
guilt, and found that he had committed multiple felonies. 204
Despite the evidence and verdicts, the Supreme Court found that the
trial judge violated Faretta’s Sixth Amendment right to represent
himself. 205 Moreover, the Court did not apply harmless-error analysis,
which is the typical standard of review for violations of constitutional
rights. 206 Instead, the Court reversed under the structural error standard,
that is, without asking whether Faretta could have done better without
his unwanted lawyer. 207 The dissent derided the defendant’s new
constitutional “right . . . to make a fool of himself.” 208 The majority
conceded that self-representation would likely harm defendants, but

198. See infra section II.A.1.
199. See infra section II.A.5.
200. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975).
201. Id. at 807.
202. Joint App. at 49, 54, 58–59, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (No. 73-5772) [hereinafter
Faretta JA].
203. Id. at 58–59.
204. Id. at 11–19, 26.
205. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835–36.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see Erica J. Hashimoto, Defending the Right of
Self-Representation: An Empirical Look at the Pro Se Felony Defendant, 85 N.C. L. REV. 423, 442,
444–46 (2007) (presenting data on positive pro se outcomes while conceding the study’s
limitations).
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insisted that the right to refuse court-appointed counsel vindicates “that
respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.” 209
Faretta is traditionally viewed as championing individual autonomy
against overbearing government authority. 210 More specifically, the
standard narrative claims the case as safeguarding the liberty of poor
people against social-welfare paternalism. 211 But that narrative elides a
crucial and often ignored fact: Anthony Faretta wanted a governmentpaid lawyer. 212
Citing the Sixth Amendment, Faretta “urged without success that he
was entitled to counsel of his choice, and three times moved for the
appointment of a lawyer other than the public defender” whom the
judges had chosen for him. 213 Courts routinely appoint such “panel” or
“list” lawyers, often when public defender offices are overloaded or
have conflicts. 214
By invoking his right to choose counsel, Faretta offered an alternative
to three unattractive options. The first unattractive option was for Faretta
to proceed without a lawyer. The second was for Faretta to proceed with
the unwanted lawyer from the public defender office. The third was
years of subsequent litigation ending in reversal of Faretta’s convictions.
Instead of granting Faretta’s request for a different lawyer or his
back-up request to represent himself, the trial judge forced him to
proceed with the unwanted public defender and infected the proceedings
with structural error. 215 Interestingly, Faretta’s right-to-choose claim was
not addressed on direct appeal, despite the facts that he raised the issue
at trial and that the issue was pending before the state Supreme Court.216
209. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350–51 (1970) (Brennan,
J., concurring)).
210. See, e.g., Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 165
(2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our system of laws generally presumes that the criminal defendant,
after being fully informed, knows his own best interests and does not need them dictated by the
State. Any other approach is unworthy of a free people.”).
211. Id. (stating that the Framers “would not have found acceptable the compulsory assignment
of counsel by the government to plead a criminal defendant’s case” (emphasis in original)); see also
id. (stating that such an imposition “‘imprison[s] a man in his privileges and call[s] it the
Constitution.’” (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942))).
212. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 811 n.5; Faretta JA, supra note 202, at 49.
213. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 811 n.5; Faretta JA, supra note 202, at 49.
214. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 63, at 82–84.
215. Faretta JA, supra note 202, at 50, 54, 58–59.
216. Id. at 25–26 (appending People v. Faretta 1–2 (2d Dist. Crim. No. 22722, June 26, 1973));
see also Drumgo v. Superior Court of Marin Cty., 506 P.2d 1007 (Cal. 1973). Drumgo issued on
March 5, 1973—well after Faretta’s 1972 trial proceedings, but before his appeal was decided.
Faretta JA, supra note 202, at 25.
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Nor did Faretta include the right-to-choose claim in his pro se petition to
the U.S. Supreme Court. 217 Only the lone Supreme Court amicus brief
urged reversal based on the violation of Faretta’s right to choose. 218 The
majority opinion submerged the issue in a passing reference to
California’s “not unusual rule[] . . . [that a]n indigent criminal defendant
has no right to appointed counsel of his choice.” 219
Thus, the “no-choice-for-the-poor” statement was literally a footnote
in Faretta. 220 Excavating Faretta’s subtext exposes an untold right-tochoose story that counters the traditional right-to-refuse case narrative.
In the guise of “affirm[ing] the dignity and autonomy” of the
individual, 221 Faretta substitutes one form of coercion for another and
gores indigent defendants on a sharp-horned dilemma. Unable to secure
counsel of choice, they must proceed either with an unwanted attorney
or with unwanted (and as the Court conceded, probably prejudicial) pro
se status. 222
Thus, Faretta won the oxymoronic right of being forced to refuse
counsel. This conundrum may help explain why the Court has imposed
many subsequent restrictions on Faretta while insisting that pro se
defendants “may, at least occasionally” present their own “best possible
defense.” 223 Faretta’s untold story raises other possibilities. On one
hand, Faretta might have been unhappy with, and rejected the assistance
of any lawyer appointed to his case. On the other hand, granting
indigents like Faretta the right to choose counsel “may, at least
occasionally”—and likely would, more often—prevent protracted
litigation, preserve finality of judgments, promote attorney-client
cooperation, and shore up system legitimacy.
Despite these potential benefits of an inclusive Sixth Amendment
right of attorney choice that applies equally to all defendants, Supreme

217. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (No. 73-5772).
218. Brief for Amicus Curiae John E. Thorne at 9–15, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)
(No. 73-5772).
219. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 812 n.8 (citing Drumgo, 506 P.2d 1007). Drumgo was decided after
Faretta’s trial and while his appeal was pending. See supra note 216.
220. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 810 n.5, 812 n.8.
221. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 176–77 (1984).
222. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 812 n.8.
223. McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177, 184–85 (approving appointment of “standby” trial counsel); see
also Indiana v. Edwards, 554 U.S. 164, 171 (2008) (approving appointment of counsel over the
objection of mentally ill defendant found competent to stand trial); Martinez v. Court of Appeal of
Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000) (denying right to proceed pro se on direct
appeal).
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Court cases decided after Faretta continued to recite dicta denigrating
the indigent defendant’s interest in the identity of his or her lawyer.
2.

No Right to the Relationship?: Morris v. Slappy

Morris v. Slappy is like Faretta in that neither case involved a
Supreme Court ruling on the broad Sixth Amendment right of indigent
defendants to choose their lawyers. 224 Courts and commentators
sometimes mistakenly cite Slappy as rejecting the indigent defendant’s
right to choose; in support, they recite the majority’s grumpy statement
that criminal defendants have “no Sixth Amendment right to a
meaningful [attorney-client] relationship.” 225 Professor Janet Hoeffel
correctly describes those words as dicta. 226 This subpart builds on
Professor Hoeffel’s argument by explaining the distinction between
Slappy’s holding and dicta, as well as the implications of that distinction
for an inclusive right of attorney choice that applies equally to all
defendants.
Slappy arose in the opposite circumstances of Faretta. Shortly before
Joseph Slappy’s trial, his public defender was hospitalized. 227 Slappy
wanted to keep that lawyer on his case. 228 Instead, despite Slappy’s
protests, the judge ordered another public defender to take over. 229
Slappy was convicted of multiple serious felonies and lost his state court
appeals. 230 A Ninth Circuit panel held that the trial judge had improperly
denied Slappy’s motion to continue the case. 231 The panel concluded that
the judge’s ruling violated the Sixth Amendment, applied structural error
review, and ordered a new trial. 232
The Supreme Court reversed. 233 All nine justices agreed on a single
procedural ground for reversing: the Ninth Circuit mistook Slappy’s
224. See Janet C. Hoeffel, Toward a More Robust Right to Counsel of Choice, 44 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 525, 534 (2007) (discussing Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983)).
225. See, e.g., Virgen v. Ryan, No. CV-13-1294-TUC-DTF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141861, at
*17 (D. Ariz. Oct. 6, 2014); SALTZBURG, ET AL., supra note 1.
226. Hoeffel, supra note 224, at 526, 528–32, 545–50 (discussing Slappy, 461 U.S. at 13–15 &
n.6).
227. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 5.
228. Id. at 8.
229. Id. at 5–9; id. at 25–26 (Brennan, J., concurring) (describing the trial court’s failure to
inquire into likely length of delay).
230. Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 718–20 (9th Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds, 461 U.S. 1
(1983).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 15.
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protests as a timely motion to continue. 234 All nine justices also agreed
that the trial judge properly exercised his calendaring authority and
properly sought timely resolution of Slappy’s cases by proceeding with
substitute counsel. 235 In the course of ruling on these procedural
grounds, the majority went on to opine that “there is no Sixth
Amendment right to a meaningful attorney-client relationship,” and
described that statement as a “holding.” 236 Lower courts occasionally
cite this “holding” to override indigent defendants’ choice of counsel.237
A closer reading shows that those citations are unsupported. First,
they fail to account for the full text of the “no right to a relationship”
statement. The majority went on to explain that “[n]o court could
possibly guarantee that a defendant will develop the kind of rapport with
his attorney—privately retained or provided by the public—that the
Court of Appeals thought part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of
counsel.” 238 Properly understood, the “no right to a relationship”
statement merely sets inarguable boundaries for any positive
constitutional right: it must be clearly defined in order to be judicially
enforced.
The second reason that Slappy does not support the “no-choice”
stance is procedural. Despite the majority’s labeling of the “no right to a
relationship” statement as a “holding,” all nine justices also described
the statement and related discussion as unnecessary to resolving the
case. 239 Such unnecessary discussion is dictum. 240 The Court has also
(sometimes) followed a “settled policy to avoid unnecessary decisions of

234. Id. at 4, 11–13 (majority opinion of Burger, C.J., White, Powell, Rehnquist & O’Connor,
JJ.); id. at 17–19 (Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., concurring); id. at 29 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
235. Id. at 4, 11–13 (majority opinion of Burger, C.J., White, Powell, Rehnquist & O’Connor,
JJ.); id. at 17–19 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring); id. at 29 (Blackmun & Stevens, JJ.,
concurring).
236. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 13–15, 14 n.6.
237. See, e.g., Virgen v. Ryan, No. CV-13-1294-TUC-DTF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 141861, at
*17 (D. Ariz. Oct. 6, 2014).
238. Slappy, 461 U.S. at 13–14.
239. Id. at 4 (opinion of Burger, C.J., White, Powell, Rehnquist, & O’Connor, JJ.) (describing
procedural ground as “dispositive, independent of the . . . novel Sixth Amendment guarantee
announced by the Court of Appeals”); id. at 15, 19 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring) (citing
majority’s “recognition that [the Sixth Amendment issue] is unnecessary to its decision”); id. at 29
(Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., concurring) (describing the majority’s Sixth Amendment discussion as
“dicta”).
240. Judicial dictum, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 549 (10th ed. 2010) (defining “judicial dictum”
as “[a]n opinion by a court . . . that is not essential to the decision and therefore not binding”); see
also Stinson, supra note 193.
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constitutional issues.” 241 That policy may have led all nine justices to
indicate that their unanimous agreement on the lack of a timely
continuance motion was dispositive to the case, rendering the “no right
to a relationship” statements superfluous. 242
That reasoning follows even if one allows alternative grounds as
holdings. 243 Fleshing out the distinction between Slappy’s dicta and
holding reduces the precedential value of the case for those who would
continue to deny indigent defendants the same Sixth Amendment right to
choose counsel that is enjoyed by defendants with means to hire counsel.
As Professor Hoeffel argues, at minimum those dicta should not
dissuade judges from advancing Sixth Amendment concerns for fairness
and finality by deferring to existing attorney-client relationships when
ruling on motions to continue. 244
In fact, Slappy offers strong support for an inclusive right to attorney
choice that applies equally to all defendants. The Court itself has made
this point clear by citing Slappy as commanding strong deference to
courts’ calendaring authority. 245 Judges exercise that authority from the
earliest stage of criminal proceedings when attorney-client relationships
are first being formed. They do so whether those relationships involve
retained or appointed counsel. These preexisting practices, and the
resulting limitations on attorney choice in our current systems for
connecting clients with counsel, should ease transitions to an inclusive
right of counsel choice rule that applies equally to all defendants. The
same is true of the additional restrictions that the Court imposed upon
attorney choice in Wheat 246 and Caplin 247—despite the subsequent
easing of one such restriction in Luis. 248

241. Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 305 (1982).
242. See Slappy, 461 U.S. at 4, 11–13 (majority opinion of Burger, C.J., White, Powell,
Rehnquist & O’Connor, JJ.); id. at 17–19 (Blackmun & Stevens, JJ., concurring); id. at 29
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
243. See Abramowicz & Stearns, supra note 193, at 953, 961, 972 (holdings must “lead to the
judgment” but may include “alternative justifications”); see id. at 1029–32 (distinguishing
supportive and nonsupportive propositions, cautioning that judicial resolution of issues “in a manner
that does not contribute to the disposition of the case [indicates] a strong possibility that the
judge . . . holds relatively strong views”).
244. Hoeffel, supra note 224, at 540–45; cf. Slappy v. Morris, 649 F.2d 718, 721–22 (9th Cir.
1981), rev’d, 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
245. Kaley v. United States, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1107 (2014); United States v. GonzalezLopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006).
246. Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 154 (1988) (holding that Sixth Amendment
presumption in favor of counsel can be overcome by demonstration of conflict or serious potential
for conflict).
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Rights, Risks, and Retainers: Wheat, Caplin, and Luis

Like Morris v. Slappy, Wheat v. United States and Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States held that competing interests can
trump a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to choose his or her
lawyer. 249 Slappy requires deference to the trial judge’s calendaring
authority. 250 In Wheat, the Supreme Court ruled that a lawyer’s conflict
of interest can trump the right to choose that lawyer—even when the
defendant waives the protection against such conflict, and even when
prosecutors arguably manufactured the conflict to bump a successful
defense lawyer off the case. 251 In Caplin, the Court held that interests in
crime suppression can trump attorney choice—even when asset
forfeitures require law firms to surrender large retainers and fees. 252
The defendants in Wheat and Caplin had ample means to hire their
lawyers. 253 Therefore, the question whether indigent defendants have a
Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel was not before the Court in
either case. In Wheat, the issue of constitutionally-protected attorney
choice for indigents was wholly irrelevant to the question whether
conflicts of interest could trump the right to attorney choice. The Wheat
majority nevertheless noted in passing, while discussing other
restrictions on the Sixth Amendment right to choose, that “a defendant
may not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford or who
for other reasons declines to represent the defendant.” 254
The Wheat majority cited no authority for this dictum. Nevertheless,
the Caplin majority seized it and doubled down. In that case, the Court
rejected a law firm’s attempt to recover fees that were forfeited to the
government after the client pled guilty. 255 The firm argued that the
government violated its client’s Sixth Amendment right to choose

247. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 618 (1989) (holding that a
forfeiture statute does not impermissibly burden a Sixth Amendment right to retain counsel of one’s
choice).
248. Luis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016).
249. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 618; Wheat, 486 U.S. at 154.
250. See Slappy, 461 U.S. at 4, 11–13 (majority opinion of Burger, C.J.); id. at 17–19 (Brennan,
J., concurring); id. at 29 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
251. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163 (acknowledging risk of manufactured conflict); id. at 170 n.3
(Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (citing evidence of prosecutorial bad faith).
252. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 619–21.
253. See supra note 192.
254. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 158–59.
255. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 623–25.
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counsel by seizing the assets he would have used to pay the firm. 256 In
the course of the opinion, the Caplin majority stated that:
Petitioner does not, nor could it defensibly do so, assert that
impecunious defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to
choose their counsel. . . . [T]hose who do not have the means to
hire their own lawyers have no cognizable complaint so long as
they are adequately represented by attorneys appointed by the
courts. 257
The Caplin court then vindicated the government’s “pecuniary
interest” in the defendant’s multimillion dollar assets. 258 The Court
concluded that ill-gotten gains do not properly belong to wrongdoers,
and therefore eliminated the defendant’s “undeserved economic
power . . . to command high-priced legal talent.” 259 For such people, the
Court reasoned, appointed or pro bono counsel would suffice, 260 given
“the harsh reality” that quality representation often turns on hiring “the
best counsel money can buy.” 261 A companion case applied the same
reasoning to approve pretrial, post-indictment forfeiture of assets that the
defendant otherwise would have used to pay counsel of choice. 262

256. Id. at 621–22.
257. Id. at 624.
258. Id. at 626–30; see also id. at 629 n.6 (noting the government’s sale of “just one [of the
defendant’s assets], a parcel of land known as ‘Shelburne Glebe,’ . . . for $ 5.3 million.”); Pamela S.
Karlan, Discrete and Relational Criminal Representation: The Changing Vision of the Right to
Counsel, 105 HARV. L. REV. 670, 718–20 (1992) (discussing government interests in preventing
attorney facilitation of organized criminal activity).
259. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 630 (quoting In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale,
Chartered, 837 F. 2d 637, 649 (1988)).
260. Id. at 625.
261. Id. at 630 (quoting Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 23 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
262. United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 615 (1989); see also Kaley v. United States,
__ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1102–03 (2014) (following Monsanto to hold that the Sixth
Amendment does not require pretrial hearings to challenge asset freezes based on alleged lack of
probable cause to prosecute). But see id. at 1105 (inviting Congressional override); Luis v. United
States, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1087 (2016) (plurality opinion) (pretrial forfeiture of
“untainted” assets violates Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel); id. at 1096–97 (Thomas, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 1112 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (describing Monsanto as “troubling”
and “not altogether convinc[ing],” but noting that since Luis did not ask the Court to overrule or
modify Monsanto the Court had to take the case “as a given”). On the Kaley invitation for
Congressional override, see U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley, Q&A: Civil Asset Forfeiture (Apr. 20,
2015), http://www.grassley.senate.gov/ news/commentary/qa-civil-asset-forfeiture [https://perma.
cc/UK6V-RPA2] (“Part of addressing this problem lies in reversing the Supreme Court’s recent
decision that allows the government to prevent people from showing that they need access to their
seized funds to hire a lawyer.”); Jonathan P. Bach, Written Statement on Behalf of the New York
Council of Defense Lawyers Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary for the
Hearing Entitled “The Need to Reform Asset Forfeiture” (Apr. 15, 2015),
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The Caplin dissent attacked the majority rulings in both of these
companion cases for subordinating the right of well-off defendants to
buy a top-shelf commodity. 263 The dissent warned that to “beggar”
people of means—that is, to put them on the same plane as indigents
with
overworked,
underfunded
public
defenders—would
“[devastate] . . . our adversarial system of justice” and dirty courts’
hands by besmirching “the integrity of the judicial process.” 264 Such
degradation threatened the attorney-client trust required “to be a truly
effective advocate” because appointed counsel “is too readily perceived
as the Government’s agent rather than [the defendant’s] own.” 265 The
dissent also predicted that forfeiture would drive high-priced talent out
of the market, causing the “virtual socialization of criminal
defense . . . [,]
standardiz[ed] . . . criminal-defense
services
and
diminish[ed] defense counsel[] independence.” 266
It is difficult to imagine a more open and forceful indictment of the
Court’s failure to enforce a meaningful Sixth Amendment right to
counsel for the poor than the Caplin dissent’s denunciation of indigent
defense representation. Comments about indigent defendants in these
majority and dissenting opinions also mark the Court’s nearest approach
to an actual ruling that poor people have no right to choose their lawyers.
On this reading, it is only because indigents have no such right that the
Court could transform otherwise well-off defendants into beggars who
cannot be choosers.
Closer scrutiny and subsequent case law show that such a reading is
mistaken. Statements in Caplin regarding the lack of constitutionally
protected attorney choice for indigents are unnecessary to the holding of
the case. 267 Instead of holding as a matter of law that indigent defendants
have no right to choose their lawyers, Caplin instead followed Slappy
and Wheat in holding that a sufficiently strong countervailing
governmental interest can trump the right to choose counsel. 268 In
Slappy, the Court protected judicial discretion over dockets and court
calendars. 269 In Wheat, the Court protected the integrity of criminal
http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/04-15-15%20Bach%20Testimony.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/XWW4-FSBM] (arguing for amendment reversing Kaley).
263. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 644–48 (Blackmun, Marshall, Brennan & Stevens, JJ., dissenting).
264. Id. at 635, 645.
265. Id. at 645.
266. Id.
267. See supra notes 192–93.
268. Caplin, 491 U.S. at 625–33.
269. See supra section II.A.2.
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proceedings from conflicts of interest. 270 In Caplin, the Court protected
government interests in separating criminals from their ill-gotten
gains. 271
The rulings in these cases turn on the Court’s weighing of the
countervailing government interest. The rulings do not turn on the
separate question whether indigent defendants have the same
(trumpable) Sixth Amendment right to choose their lawyers as
defendants who have the means to hire counsel. Significantly, four
members of the Court, including the Chief Justice, applied exactly this
type of interest-balancing analysis to right-to-choose limitations in Luis
v. United States, 272 and a fifth Justice appears prepared to do the same. 273
In Luis, the government froze $2 million of the defendant’s assets as
potentially forfeitable due to her alleged involvement in a criminal
conspiracy. 274 The defendant claimed that the freeze involved
“legitimate, untainted” assets that were “not traceable to a criminal
offense,” which she needed in order to hire the lawyers she wanted to
work on her case. 275 The plurality concluded that the government’s
interest in the untainted assets could not trump the defendant’s
countervailing Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel. 276 Justice
Kagan expressed sympathy with that conclusion in her dissent. 277
While applying this interest-balancing approach to the right to choose
counsel, the Luis plurality, like the Caplin dissent, was solicitous of the
“substantial risk” that forcing wealthy defendants into overburdened
public defense systems through asset forfeiture would render their Sixth
Amendment right to counsel “less effective.” 278 Two dissenting Justices
in Luis found that allegation “troubling,” and condemned the majority’s
“constitutional command to treat a defendant accused of committing a

270. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 258–62 and accompanying text.
272. Luis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1093–94 (2016) (describing government
interests in the defendant’s assets as “important” but “compared to the right to counsel of
choice . . . seem[ing] to lie somewhat further from the heart of a fair, effective criminal justice
system”).
273. Id. at 1112 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (doubting whether “[g]overnment’s interest in recovering
the proceeds of crime ought to trump the defendant’s . . . right to retain counsel of choice”).
274. Id. at 1087–88.
275. Id. at 1088.
276. Id. at 1086. Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion concluded that no balancing test applied.
Id. at 1101–03 (Thomas, J., concurring).
277. Id. at 1112.
278. Id. at 1095.
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lucrative crime differently than a defendant who is indigent from the
outset.” 279
Those dissenting Justices in Luis hinted at the equal protection
problems infecting the differential treatment of indigent defendants and
defendants with means to hire counsel regarding the fundamental
constitutional right to choose counsel. Those problems are unpacked
more fully in section II.B. For current purposes, it suffices to note that,
despite their differences in Luis, all eight Justices invoke the “no-choicefor-the-poor” mantra. 280 As the foregoing analysis shows, however,
reciting a mantra does not make the mantra law. The Court could have
reached the same results in these cases even if the indigent defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to choose were firmly established as a matter of
law. In that scenario, forcing people into public defense systems through
forfeiture of tainted assets would simply narrow their field of choice to
the same set of qualified, conflict-free counsel who made themselves
available to indigents. The fact that the range of choices would be
narrower does not mean that there would be no right to choose at all.
Deeper understanding of the substantive and procedural importance of
that right, and the unconstitutional, antidemocratic effects of denying
that right to poor people, requires a closer look at United States v.
Gonzalez-Lopez.
4.

Gonzalez-Lopez and the Sixth Amendment Right to Shop

Gonzalez-Lopez is distinguished among right-to-choose cases because
the government conceded that the trial judge violated that right. 281 The
sole issue before the Court was the appropriate standard of review. 282
The Court affirmed the majority rule in the lower courts that the error is
structural and requires automatic reversal without either the harmlesserror inquiry typical of other federal constitutional claims or the more
onerous performance-and-prejudice inquiry of Strickland v.

279. Id. at 1110 (Kennedy and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
280. Id. at 1089 (plurality opinion); id. at 1102 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1109 (Kennedy &
Alito, JJ., dissenting); see also Kaley v. United States, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1102–03 (2014)
(majority opinion authored by Justice Kagan).
281. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152 (2006). Other Supreme Court cases in
addition to those discussed here affirm the criminal defendant’s right to have an opportunity to hire
a lawyer. See, e.g., Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 10 (1954) (construing due process right to
counsel and stating that “a defendant must be given a reasonable opportunity to employ and consult
with counsel; otherwise, the right to be heard by counsel would be of little worth”).
282. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 140–41.
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Washington. 283 Thus, the ruling elevated a criminal defendant’s right to
choose an attorney into the tiny structural-error pantheon comprising the
rights to an impartial judge, a public trial, and a grand jury selected
without racial discrimination.284 The terse majority opinion
accomplished that result in two moves.
First, the Court distinguished two Sixth Amendment rights: the right
to choose a particular lawyer and the right to receive effective assistance
from that lawyer. 285 The majority reasoned that, although it is “the
purpose of [both] rights . . . to ensure a fair trial,” the right to choose a
lawyer “has never been derived from the Sixth Amendment’s purpose of
ensuring a fair trial.” 286 Nor, it must be added, is the right to choose
contained in the Amendment’s textual guarantee that an accused will
“have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”287 Assistance means
“help,” 288 which a defendant can “have” just as readily through
benevolence or performance of assigned duty as through the purchase of
services in the marketplace.
The right to choose is similarly deracinated from the Amendment’s
surrounding text. The right to assistance of counsel is not free-standing.
It concludes a series of independent entitlements to notice, a speedy and
public trial, confrontation of adverse witnesses, and compulsory
process. 289 Satisfaction of these rights requires action by a prosecutor, a
court, or both. None can be realized solely through a criminal
defendant’s independent exercise of will or purchase of private services
in the marketplace. 290
Whence, then, the right to choose? The Gonzalez-Lopez majority
openly admitted to having “formulated” it, while describing the right to
choose as “the root meaning” of the Sixth Amendment right to
283. Id. at 148–52 (2006), aff’g 399 F.3d 924, 933–34 (8th Cir. 2005); see also Holly, supra note
169, at 186 n.28, 187–88 (discussing federal circuit court decisions applying structural error
analysis in right-to-choose cases).
284. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.
285. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 146–48, 149 n.4.
286. Id. at 145–47.
287. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
288. Assistance, OXFORD DICTIONARIES, http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/
american_english/assistance [https://perma.cc/GJT4-QNNP].
289. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
290. Cf. Paul Alessio Mezzina, Elevating Choice over Quality of Representation: United States v.
Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557 (2006), 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 451, 455–56, 461 (2006)
(citing and distinguishing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
FIRST PRINCIPLES 90 (1997), and noting that there is little argument that the “per se entitlement to
appointed counsel . . . was not identified by the Court until some 150 years after the signing of the
Constitution”).
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assistance of counsel. 291 The Court cited three cases and a history book
to support this formulation. 292 Two of the cases, Wheat and an 1898
habeas case, Andersen v. Treat, 293 actually rejected the defendants’ rightto-choose claims 294—beautifully illustrating the “peculiar sacredness” of
right-to-counsel doctrine. 295
Moreover, deeper excavation of the right’s history reveals a complex
tangle of root meanings. In the founding era, free-market choice
commingled with overt denigration of the poor 296 as well as with
benevolence of some pro bono counsel and conscription of others to
provide representation for indigent defendants. 297 Indeed, founding-era
egalitarianism encompassed long-standing practices of appointing
counsel for indigent criminal defendants, as well as proposals to
socialize all legal services and create a federal Advocate General to
defend the people as zealously as the Attorney General would
prosecute. 298
All that said, neither the Court’s cursory originalism nor the tangled
root meanings of the right to counsel undermine the Court’s conclusion
in Gonzalez-Lopez: the right to choose counsel is among those root
meanings, and that violation of the right alters the “framework” of
litigation. 299 As the Luis plurality acknowledged, the right of counsel

291. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147–48, 147 n.3; cf. Luis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 136 S.
Ct. 1083, 1097 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel was “originally
understood to protect only the right to hire counsel of choice”) (emphasis added); id. at 1098 (“As
understood in 1791, the Sixth Amendment protected a defendant’s right to retain an attorney he
could afford.”).
292. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 147–48, 147 n.3 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153,
159 (1988), Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932), Andersen v. Treat, 172 U.S. 24 (1898), and
WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 18–24, 27–33 (1955)).
293. 172 U.S. 24 (1898).
294. Wheat, 486 U.S. at 164; Andersen, 172 U.S. at 30−31.
295. Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 447 (1940) (rejecting defendant’s right-to-counsel claim
while proclaiming the right’s “peculiar sacredness,” and citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S.
370, 374−75 (1892)).
296. See MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE 14−20 (1996); ALEXANDER
KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES
7−21, 49−50 (2000).
297. See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 467 & n.20 (1942); Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1
Stat. 112, 118; BEANEY, supra note 292, at 16−21.
298. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 81 (1973) and CHARLES
WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 130−31, 212−23 (1911).
299. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 150 (2006); cf. Luis v. United States,
__ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1097 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was “originally understood to protect only the right to hire counsel of
choice” (emphasis added)).
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choice relates directly to “the necessarily close working relationship
between lawyer and client, the need for confidence, and the critical
importance of trust . . . .” 300 Counsel choice often affects pretrial
investigation, discovery, and plea counseling as well as theory
development, jury selection, presentation of evidence, closing argument,
and sentencing advocacy. 301 Counsel choice also alters relationships
between the defense and prosecutors, on one hand, and the defense and
jurors, on the other. 302
The Gonzalez-Lopez Court concluded that such systemic effects of
attorney choice make it “impossible to know” how events would have
unfolded had there been no violation of the right to choose. 303 Like the
poet in the autumn wood, appellate judges can only highlight choice
itself as making “all the difference.” 304 Roads not taken lead to an
“alternate universe” from which appellate judges are epistemologically
and legally banned. 305 Indeed, the right of attorney choice is considered
so crucial that at least one jurisdiction subjects alleged violations to
immediate appeal. 306
These procedural facts are remarkable. Criminal defendants rarely
enjoy either the right of interlocutory appeal or the benefit of structural
error review. Equally notable is the fact that Gonzalez-Lopez, like the
defendants in Wheat, Caplin, and Luis, had ample means to hire counsel
of choice. Indeed, Gonzalez-Lopez had not just one lawyer retained on
his case, or two, but three. 307
Nevertheless, after defining the “root meaning” of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel as choosing counsel, and after adding
counsel choice to the tiny set of constitutional rights that are reversible
for structural error, the majority added dicta that denied the same right to
300. Luis, 136 S. Ct. at 1089.
301. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150.
302. Id. at 150–51. Notably, the Gonzalez-Lopez majority did not reiterate the grumpy statements
in Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983), that the Sixth Amendment does not entitle criminal
defendants to a “meaningful relationship” with their attorneys. While the dissent did so, GonzalezLopez, 548 U.S. at 154, the majority instead cited Slappy’s unremarkable holding that trial judges
have discretion to consider scheduling matters when ruling on a defendant’s motion to continue. Id.
at 152 (citing Slappy, 461 U.S. at 11–12); cf. Kaley v. United States, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1090,
1107 (2014).
303. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150.
304. Robert Frost, The Road Not Taken, MOUNTAIN INTERVAL 9 (1916).
305. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 150.
306. State v. Chambliss, 947 N.E.2d 651, 655 (Ohio 2011) (concluding that Gonzalez-Lopez
abrogated the holding of Flanagan v. United States, 465 U.S. 259 (1984), that such rulings are not
immediately appealable).
307. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 142–43.
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poor people. 308 The four dissenters threw in with the majority on this
point. 309 No member of the Court disputed the statement that “the right
to counsel of choice does not extend to defendants who require counsel
to be appointed for them.” 310
Thus, Gonzalez-Lopez continued the development of the Sixth
Amendment’s root meaning into the right of the individual, autonomous
consumer to purchase services in the marketplace. Yet the dictum
barring indigent defendants from attorney choice was not based on the
sparse briefing in the case. The parties’ written submissions were silent
on the subject, with one exception. A single line at the end of the
government’s reply brief noted the “anomaly” of granting “defendants
with means” the right to choose while denying the same right to the
poor. 311
The “no-choice” dictum in Gonzalez-Lopez was similarly
unsupported by any meaningful exchange during oral argument. When
the Chief Justice was told that indigents do not have the right to choose a
lawyer, he asked, “Why not?” 312 Justice Kennedy then indicated that the
core justification proffered for the right to choose—the vindication of
personal autonomy—would apply to indigents as well as defendants
with means to hire counsel. 313
Gonzalez-Lopez’s lawyer responded that the government has no duty
to provide individuals with the means to effectuate their rights, citing the
failure to distribute printing presses under the First Amendment. 314 He
further argued that the right to choose is confined to “the [ten] percent,
or whatever number” of defendants who can afford to hire counsel, and
that class-based disparate enforcement is warranted by the interests of
this “small . . . but . . . important universe of people” in exercising
personal autonomy. 315
308. Id. at 147–48.
309. See id. at 152–62.
310. Id. at 151 (citing Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)).
311. Reply Brief for the United States at 16, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140
(2006) (No. 05-352).
312. Transcript of Oral Argument at 33–34, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140
(2006) (No. 05-352).
313. Id. at 30–32; cf. Luis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1110 (2016) (Kennedy &
Alito, JJ., dissenting) (questioning the majority’s “constitutional command to treat a defendant
accused of committing a lucrative crime differently than a defendant who is indigent from the
outset”).
314. Transcript of Oral Argument at 35, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 (2006)
(No. 05-352).
315. Id. at 35–36.
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The Duty to Declare: Montejo v. Louisiana

Gonzalez-Lopez’s vindication of personal autonomy and freedom of
choice continues a theme from Faretta. Both of these cases reversed
criminal convictions for structural error and did so out of similar
“respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.” 316 The
same constitutional interests in personal autonomy and freedom of
choice played a prominent role in Wheat and Caplin. In those cases,
dissenting justices emphasized that the majority opinions imposed
restrictions on the right to choose counsel that improperly sacrificed
personal autonomy in favor of government interests. 317 The plurality
opinion in Luis framed similar concerns in terms of the significance
under the Sixth Amendment of “the necessarily close working
relationship between lawyer and client, the need for confidence, and the
critical importance of trust.” 318
Close analysis of Montejo v. Louisiana 319 reveals a similar focus on
core constitutional values of personal autonomy and choice. It is easy to
miss this point and the strong support Montejo offers for an inclusive
right of attorney choice that applies to all defendants. Indeed, Montejo
echoes the “no-choice-for-the-poor” dicta from Gonzalez-Lopez. 320
Nevertheless, the Court’s ruling in Montejo turns on the indigent
defendant’s capacity for exercising personal autonomy and choice with
respect to appointment of counsel. Thus, the Court’s own choicechampioning reasoning again trumps discriminatory “no-choice” dicta.
Montejo arose in Louisiana, where the defendant was charged with
murder. 321 Local rules required automatic appointment of counsel in
such cases. 322 As Montejo’s lawyer scrambled to meet his new client and
discourage uncounseled communication about the case, law enforcement
officers were already interrogating their suspect.323 They did so after
316. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350–
51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
317. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 644–45 (1989) (Blackmun,
Marshall, Brennan & Stevens, JJ., dissenting); Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 165–66 (1988)
(Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting).
318. Luis v. United States, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1089 (2016) (plurality opinion).
319. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009).
320. Id. at 784 (citing United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006)). Like all of
the leading right-to-choose cases, Montejo involved a testy 5-4 division among the justices. Id. at
779.
321. Id. at 781–82.
322. Id.
323. Id.
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obtaining Montejo’s waiver of his right to consult with counsel before
and during the interrogation. 324 The tactic paid off. The officers obtained
incriminating information from Montejo, and the prosecutor used that
evidence to win a capital murder conviction and death sentence. 325
Montejo argued that admission of his uncounseled statements at trial
was reversible error. 326 Many assumed that the issue was settled in
Montejo’s favor more than twenty years earlier. Under Michigan v.
Jackson, 327 the prosecutor faced a rebuttable presumption that Montejo’s
waiver of appointed counsel was invalid and the uncounseled statements
were therefore inadmissible. Instead of ruling accordingly, the 5-4
Montejo majority distinguished and then overruled Jackson. 328
The reasoning offered to support this ruling also supports the indigent
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel. In distinguishing
and overruling Jackson, the Montejo Court reasoned that, when Montejo
was automatically appointed counsel, he did “nothing at all to express
his intentions with respect to his Sixth Amendment rights” and therefore
there was “[n]o reason . . . to assume that [he] . . . would not be perfectly
amenable to speaking with the police without having counsel present.” 329
The Court concluded that such amenability promoted “truth-seeking”
and outweighed the “marginal benefits” of Jackson’s heightened Sixth
Amendment protections. 330
Montejo’s relevance to the right-to-choose issue should now be clear.
The Court imposed a duty upon defendants to declare their interest in
protected Sixth Amendment attorney-client relationships in order to
vindicate those protected interests fully—even when those relationships
are created automatically as a matter of law. 331 The duty to declare and
the correlative right to choose presume and promote the exercise of
virtually identical capacities for personal autonomy and freedom of
choice that permeate the Court’s right-to-choose reasoning. It therefore
makes good sense to pair Montejo’s imposition of a heightened duty to
understand and actively vindicate one’s own Sixth Amendment interests
with an inclusive rule that grants all defendants constitutionally
protected attorney choice.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 782–83.
475 U.S. 625, 630, 633 (1986).
Montejo, 556 U.S. at 799.
Id. at 789 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 793.
Id. at 799.
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Due Process, Equal Protection, and the “No-Choice” Rule

The foregoing analysis of Supreme Court cases uncovered support for
arguments favoring an inclusive right to attorney choice that the Court’s
“no-choice” dicta had previously masked. First, a closer look at Faretta
indicates that granting indigent defendants the right to choose counsel is
at least as likely to promote finality in case outcomes as the current rule,
which forces indigent defendants to choose between unwanted counsel
and no counsel at all. Second, Slappy and Wheat reduce administrative
problems by cabining counsel choice to lawyers who are qualified,
available, and conflict-free. Third, questions from the bench during the
Gonzalez-Lopez argument and the reasoning of the opinions in Luis
highlight the equal autonomy and liberty interests of indigents and those
with means to hire lawyers, at least with respect to choice of counsel.
Finally, the same autonomy and liberty interests underscore Montejo’s
“pro-choice” logic, which requires that indigents exercise agency and
actively assert their views regarding appointed counsel even when local
procedures render such assertions superfluous.
These constitutionally relevant interests in the indigent defendant’s
autonomy and freedom of choice implicate two additional, intertwined
constitutional doctrines that support vindication of the right to choose
counsel for indigents as well as for those with means to hire lawyers.
Those doctrines are due process and equal protection. As the Court made
clear decades ago, “[b]oth equal protection and due process emphasize
the central aim of our entire judicial system—all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, ‘stand on an equality before
the bar of justice in every American court.’” 332
That concern for equal treatment and basic fairness may help to
explain why the Supreme Court has never adopted the “no-choice-forthe-poor” rule as a matter of law. As Professor Heather Gerken notes in
a different context, “some opinions don’t write.” 333 This subsection uses
two syllogisms to explain why a Supreme Court “no-choice” ruling
won’t write. The first syllogism establishes that the Sixth Amendment
right to choose counsel is a fundamental right. The second establishes
that wealth-based denial of this fundamental right violates due process
and equal protection.

332. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17 (1956) (citation omitted); see also Tague, supra note 175;
Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Reclaiming Equality to Reframe Indigent Defense Reform, 97 MINN. L. REV.
1197, 1201 (2013).
333. Heather K. Gerken, Slipping the Bonds of Federalism, 128 HARV. L. REV. 85, 93 (2014).
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First, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a fundamental right
incorporated through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 334 The Court has further defined the “root meaning” of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel as the right to choose an attorney. 335
Therefore, the Sixth Amendment right to choose counsel should be
considered a fundamental right. 336
Second, the Court has subjected class-based, de jure discrimination
that “might invade or restrain” fundamental rights to heightened review,
reasoning that such discriminatory rules “must be closely scrutinized and
carefully confined.” 337 In doing so, the Court emphasized the importance
of such close scrutiny when “[l]ines [are] drawn on the basis of wealth
or property, [which] like those of race . . . are traditionally
disfavored.” 338 Applying that reasoning, the “no-choice” rule should
receive close scrutiny. A heavy justificatory burden should rest on those
who would continue to exclude poor people from exercising a
fundamental right that is protected for those with means to hire counsel.
Indeed, a proponent of the “no-choice” rule would seem to have an
insurmountable burden even under the lowest, rational-basis test. In key
cases, the Court has struck down wealth-based rules that discriminate
against criminal defendants. Those cases specifically reject wealth-based
discrimination affecting the right to counsel, whether that right derives
from the Sixth Amendment 339 or is an unenumerated right arising from
local rules of appellate procedure. 340
Moreover, under any level of scrutiny, the “no-choice” rule has been
more reflexive than reasoned. 341 For purposes of due process and equal
protection analysis, a defendant’s indigency does not set him or her apart
in any relevant way from defendants with means to hire attorneys. This
is certainly true regarding the exercise of personal autonomy and choice
that is protected by Faretta, Gonzalez-Lopez, and Luis, and that is
required by Montejo to fully vindicate the right to counsel. It is also true
334. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462
(1938).
335. United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147–48 n.3 (2006).
336. See Kaley v. United States, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1103 (2014); id. at 1107 (Roberts,
C.J., and Breyer & Sotomayor, JJ., dissenting).
337. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966).
338. Id. at 668.
339. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343–45 (1963).
340. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 354–58 (1963); Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605, 609
(2005); see also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18–19 (1956) (striking down fee for transcript on
appeal).
341. See supra section I.E.
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regarding the exercise of collective wisdom and will that is nascent in an
inclusive, democracy-enhancing right of counsel choice that is available
to all defendants. 342
Thus, a Supreme Court “no-choice” opinion won’t write because the
“no-choice” stance is the effective equivalent of the poll tax held
unconstitutional in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections. 343 In
both settings, a wealth-based rule excludes indigents from exercising a
right on the same terms as those with the means to purchase entry. Just
as “wealth or fee paying has . . . no relation to voting qualifications,” 344
such assets are irrelevant to exercising personal autonomy and choice, as
well as collective wisdom and will, in the context of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. Just as “the right to vote is too precious,
too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned,” 345 so, too, is the
Sixth Amendment right to choose an attorney.
III. DISCRIMINATION’S DIVISIVENESS: A NEW LOOK AT
LOWER COURT CASES
Part II revealed how the Supreme Court’s “no-choice” dicta mask
justifications for an inclusive right to counsel choice that are contained
in the same cases. In combination with equal protection and due process
doctrines disfavoring de jure wealth-based discrimination against
criminal defendants, this analysis helps to explain new tension and
divisions among state courts and lower federal courts over the “nochoice” rule. These new tensions and divisions open opportunities for
reform through litigation and policy advocacy.
A.

Tension in Wisconsin: State v. Jones

The case of Dwight Jones illustrates rising tension over the rule
excluding indigent defendants from constitutionally-protected attorney
choice. In the spring of 2005, Jones faced multiple charges arising from
car thefts in a Milwaukee parking garage. 346 Like the majority of
criminal defendants, 347 Jones had court-appointed counsel because he

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

See supra sections I.B–D.
383 U.S. at 670.
Id.
Id.
State v. Jones, 797 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Wis. 2010).
See HARLOW, supra note 4.
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could not afford to hire a lawyer. 348 Unfortunately, Jones was unhappy
with his appointed lawyer and repeatedly requested a different
attorney. 349
Jones had an advantage over some indigent defendants because
Wisconsin’s rules allow indigents some freedom to seek substitute
defense counsel. 350 Jones therefore asked for another lawyer, who was
qualified and conflict-free, months before trial. 351 The state conceded
that this request was timely; thus, it did not appear that substitution of
counsel would have impeded the progress of the case or the court’s
schedule. 352
If Jones had been among the minority of criminal defendants able to
hire a lawyer, his timely request for a qualified, available, conflict-free
attorney would have met the requirements for exercising his Sixth
Amendment right to choose an attorney. 353 Denying the request would
have been an abuse of discretion. 354 Any subsequent conviction or
sentence would have to be vacated automatically under the structural
error standard of review. 355
Consequently, had Dwight Jones been able to pay his chosen lawyer,
he would have satisfied the criteria for winning a new trial under
Gonzalez-Lopez regardless of the strength of the prosecution’s case
against him. The Supreme Court issued Gonzalez-Lopez during the
litigation of Jones’ case. 356 He met the otherwise applicable criteria for
exercising the Sixth Amendment right to choose (i.e., a timely request
for a qualified, available, conflict-free lawyer). Nevertheless, because
Jones required government-paid counsel, the trial judge required him to
prove there was an irreconcilable conflict or total breakdown of
communication with his assigned lawyer that would prevent an adequate
defense. 357 Finding no such conflict or breakdown, the court denied the
motion for new counsel. 358

348. Jones, 797 N.W.2d at 382.
349. Id. at 383–85.
350. Id. at 391–92 n.14 (citing WIS. ADMIN. CODE PD § 2.04 (2016)).
351. Id. at 383.
352. Id. at 390.
353. See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146–48 (2006) (unwarranted judicial
interference with criminal defendant’s right to choose retained counsel is structural error).
354. See id. at 148.
355. Id. at 146–48.
356. See id.; Jones, 797 N.W.2d at 382–83.
357. Jones, 797 N.W.2d at 390–91.
358. Id.
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Nor did the appellate courts vacate Jones’s subsequent convictions for
structural error. 359 Instead, he had to meet the far more onerous
ineffective assistance test of Strickland v. Washington.360 That is, he had
to prove that his lawyer engaged in unreasonable acts or omissions
according to prevailing professional standards, as well as a reasonable
probability that those failures altered the case outcome. 361
Three decades of case law and commentary document Strickland’s
shortcomings. 362 While this Article does not summarize that literature, it
suffices to say that courts have found no reversible error due to the poor
performance of sleeping lawyers, 363 habitually drunken lawyers, 364 and
lawyers who (although awake and apparently sober) fail to investigate
and present readily available evidence of actual innocence in capital
murder cases. 365 It was therefore unsurprising that Jones could not
satisfy Strickland and, as a result, that his convictions were affirmed. 366
The Wisconsin Supreme Court acknowledged that the Sixth
Amendment’s “root meaning” was meaningless for Jones solely because
he was too poor to hire a lawyer. 367 To justify the outcome, the court
invoked U.S. Supreme Court dicta that the poor have no right to choose
an attorney. 368 A concurring opinion of two justices, including
Wisconsin’s then-Chief Justice, noted that such wealth-based
discrimination in the vindication of a fundamental constitutional right
raised equal protection concerns. 369
359. Id. at 394–95.
360. Id. at 381 (citing United States v. Mutuc, 349 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 664, 688 (1984))).
361. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
362. See, e.g., JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 63, at 50.
363. See Muniz v. Smith, 647 F.3d 619, 623−25 (6th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1575
(2012) (discussing “sleeping [lawyer]” cases).
364. Frye v. Lee, 235 F.3d 897, 907 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 960 (2001) (affirming
death sentence although “troubled” at capital defense attorney’s admitted “decades-long routine” of
drinking “twelve ounces of rum” each night during trial); see also Ronald J. Tabak, Why an
Independent Appointing Authority is Necessary to Choose Counsel for Indigent People in Capital
Punishment Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1105, 1112−13 (2003).
365. See, e.g., Scanlon v. Harkleroad, 740 F. Supp. 2d 706, 728–30 (M.D.N.C. 2010), aff’d per
curiam, 467 F. App’x 164 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 164 (2012) (finding trial counsel
ineffective in guilt/innocence phase, but denying defendant new trial). The author represented
Petitioner Donald Scanlon in state and federal appellate and post-conviction challenges to his
convictions and death sentence. Scanlon, 740 F. Supp. 2d at 708.
366. State v. Jones, 797 N.W.2d 378, 394–95 (Wis. 2010).
367. Id. at 393–94; id. at 398 (Bradley, J., & Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
368. Id. at 391. But see supra section II.A (explaining that the Supreme Court’s “no-choice”
statements are dicta).
369. Jones, 797 N.W.2d at 395–98 (Bradley, J., & Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
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That concern echoes those raised by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Kennedy. 370 As discussed in section II.B, the Supreme Court has
rejected schemes that discriminate against poor people in the exercise of
fundamental constitutional rights related to court access and criminal
process. However, instead of relying on that line of cases, the Jones
concurrence proposed a different solution. The opinion suggested that
courts should level down by applying the rigorous Strickland ineffective
assistance test to rich and poor alike when the Sixth Amendment right to
choose is at issue. 371
The Jones concurrence marks new tension over the constitutionality
of the “no-choice” rule. Nevertheless, it does not appear that Jones’s
lawyer sought review in the U.S. Supreme Court. To the contrary, her
state court pleadings denied that Jones sought to choose a particular
attorney under Gonzalez-Lopez. 372 Instead, she argued, he merely sought
to reject appointed counsel under Faretta v. California—albeit serially,
as necessary to accomplish his goals. 373
That argument was not unreasonable. After all, the Faretta right to
refuse trial counsel, although subject to vociferous criticism, is wellestablished as a fundamental right. 374 Moreover, as discussed in section
II.A, the Supreme Court itself has mistakenly cited its own “no-choice”
dicta as rulings. 375 Finally, while the Court’s “no-choice” statements are
dicta, they reflect the majority rule among lower courts. 376 Any of these
reasons might have informed the reframing of Jones’s right-to-choose
claim as a serial right-to-reject claim. Nevertheless, closer examination
of lower court cases shows that Jones embodies new tensions over the
“no-choice” rule that are deepening into jurisdictional divides.

370. See supra notes 312−13 and accompanying text.
371. Jones, 797 N.W.2d at 398 (Bradley, J., & Abrahamson, C.J., concurring).
372. Brief and Appendix of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 21–22, State v. Jones, 797 N.W.2d
378 (Wis. 2010) (No. 2008AP002342-CR).
373. Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner at 1–3, State v. Jones, 797 N.W.2d 378 (Wis.
2010) (No. 2008AP002342-CR) (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975)); see supra
section II.A.1 (discussing the role of Faretta in the Supreme Court’s right-to-choose doctrine).
374. See Martinez v. Court of Appeal of Cal., Fourth Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000).
375. See supra section II.A.
376. Holly, supra note 169, at 198–99. But see Rodriguez v. Chandler, 382 F.3d 670, 674–75 (7th
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 161 L. Ed. 2d 124 (2005) (acknowledging but declining to apply majority
rule of structural error review to right-to-choose claim raised on habeas).
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Jurisdictional Divides

Close study of the case law reveals jurisdictional divides over a
specific application of the “no-choice” rule. The issue arises when
defendants hire counsel, but for financial reasons eventually must
proceed with government-paid lawyers. A few defendants have cited
their Sixth Amendment right to choose in seeking to replace retained
counsel with appointed counsel. 377 When trial judges deny those
requests, state appellate courts tend to apply the same abuse of discretion
and structural error analyses that benefit defendants with means to hire
counsel. 378
In contrast, the majority of the federal circuit courts reject such
appeals, reasoning that the defendants are merely seeking public services
and not exercising a federal constitutional right to hire counsel on the
private market. 379 Those rulings leave defendants in the same fix as any
indigent trying to replace one public defender with another. 380 They lack
the Sixth Amendment right to choose that is enjoyed by those with
means to retain counsel. 381 They must meet the more onerous cause-andprejudice test applied by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Jones. They
do not benefit from the more generous abuse of discretion and structural
error analyses enjoyed by those who can hire counsel.
The following chart illustrates points of uniformity and division
among jurisdictions. The chart categorizes the various rules that courts
apply depending on whether the defendant seeks to hire a new lawyer
(whether the prior lawyer was retained or appointed), to obtain

377. See, e.g., People v. Ortiz, 800 P.2d 547, 555–56 (Cal. 1990); People v. Munsey, 232 P.3d
113, 126–27 (Colo. App. 2009); People v. Abernathy, 926 N.E.2d 435, 444 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010);
Dixon v. Owens, 865 P.2d 1250 (Okla. Crim. App. 1993); State v. Barber, 206 P.3d 1223, 1235–36
(Utah Ct. App. 2009).
378. See, e.g., Ortiz, 800 P.2d at 555–56; Munsey, 232 P.3d at 126–27; Abernathy, 926 N.E.2d at
444; Owens, 865 P.2d 1250; Barber, 206 P.3d at 1235–36.
379. See United States v. Hagen, 468 F. App’x 373, 385 (4th Cir. 2012).
380. Id. at 383–84 (requiring defendant to show cause for substitution); United States v. MotaSantana, 391 F.3d 42, 47 (1st Cir. 2004).
381. The typical three-part balancing test requires weighing the motion’s timeliness, the scope of
the trial court’s inquiry into the reason for the motion, and the defendant’s showing of good cause
for the substitution. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 984 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Fisher, J., concurring) (discussing Ninth Circuit standard); United States v. Van Anh, 523 F.3d 43,
48 n.3 (1st Cir. 2008) (applying standard); United States v. Iles, 906 F.2d 1122, 1130–31 (6th Cir.
1990) (discussing same standard in other circuits); Drumgo v. Superior Court of Marin Cty., 506
P.2d 1007, 1010 (Cal. 1973) (denying relief for indigent defendant who sought new public
defender); State v. Jones, 797 N.W.2d 378, 393–94 (Wis. 2010) (same).
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appointed counsel as a replacement for retained counsel, or to substitute
one appointed lawyer for another:
Substitution
Type

Cause Required
States

Retained Retained
Appointed Retained
RetainedAppointed
Appointed Appointed

Circuits




Structural Error
States

Circuits













The top two rows show that courts routinely apply the most generous
standard to the minority of defendants with means to hire counsel. Those
defendants need not show cause for hiring a qualified, available,
conflict-free lawyer to replace current counsel, regardless of whether the
original attorney was retained or appointed. Denial of such motions is
considered an abuse of discretion. Subsequent convictions are reversed
automatically as structural error. 382
The bottom row shows that courts routinely hold poor people to the
most demanding standard. The majority of defendants who cannot afford
to hire counsel must show cause to substitute one appointed lawyer for
another. Showing cause is a high hurdle for many litigants, requiring an
irreconcilable conflict, total breakdown of communication, or
comparable difficulty. Even if defendants can meet that test, they cannot
reverse a subsequent conviction without proving that the wrongful denial
of the substitution motion resulted in constitutionally ineffective
assistance under Strickland. 383
The row marked with a bold outline illustrates the division between
the states and federal courts in cases involving retained-to-appointed
substitutions. State courts that have considered the issue apply the more
generous abuse of discretion and structural error standards of review
when trial judges refuse to allow defendants to substitute qualified,

382. See, e.g., Bradley v. Henry, 510 F.3d 1093, 1100–04 (9th Cir. 2007), modified and rehearing
denied, 518 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 2008).
383. See supra section III.A.
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available, conflict-free appointed counsel for retained counsel.384 In
contrast, federal courts have applied the more demanding cause-andprejudice test. 385
Still deeper analysis of the federal cases reveals new tension over the
“no-choice” rule in the retained-to-appointed substitution context as
well. Like the concurring justices in Dwight Jones’s Wisconsin Supreme
Court decision, some federal judges are indicating concern (or at least
bemusement) about the class-based discrimination embedded in the “nochoice” rule. 386 Panels from the Fifth and Ninth Circuits made initial
steps toward leveling the constitutional playing field—steps that they
promptly retracted. 387
In United States v. Mason, 388 the defendant claimed that the trial court
violated his Sixth Amendment right to choose by denying his motion to
substitute a government-paid lawyer for his retained counsel before the
sentencing proceedings. 389 The defendant had run out of money
litigating the case and felt that the hired attorney was skimping on his
efforts in an attempt to cut his losses. 390
By a 2-1 vote, the appellate panel initially ruled for the defendant and
ordered a new sentencing hearing under the Gonzalez-Lopez structural
error standard. 391 The majority found
no basis in precedent or principle for extending the right [to
choose] to defendants who seek to replace retained counsel with
new retained counsel but not to financially eligible defendants
who seek to replace retained counsel with court-appointed
counsel. 392
Noting a circuit split on the issue, the panel aligned itself with the
Ninth Circuit’s more forgiving standard. 393 That alignment lasted about

384. See supra note 378.
385. See supra note 379.
386. See United States v. Mason, 668 F.3d 203, 214 (5th Cir. 2012), withdrawn and opinion
substituted, 480 F. App’x 329 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979–
81 (9th Cir. 2010).
387. Mason, 668 F.3d. 203, 214; Mason, 480 F. App’x 329; Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d at 979–81.
388. 668 F.3d at 214.
389. Id. at 206.
390. Id. at 207–08.
391. Id. at 215–16.
392. Id. at 215 n.8.
393. Id. at 214–15 (citing United States v. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d 976, 979–81 (9th Cir. 2010)
(applying a “qualified” right to choose in the retained-appointed substitution context); United States
v. Mota-Santana, 391 F.3d 42, 45–47 (1st Cir. 2004) (reaching the opposite conclusion)).
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six months. 394 The Mason panel then retracted its constitutional holding,
and by another 2-1 vote ordered the same relief based on the trial court’s
violation of the defendant’s statutory right to appointed counsel. 395
The Ninth Circuit decision referenced in Mason made a similar move.
Two judges on the panel cited a prior opinion as “unequivocally”
holding that retained-to-appointed substitution motions “implicated the
qualified right to choice of counsel[,]” but with the concurring judge
demurring on that point, ultimately ordered relief on statutory
grounds. 396
These new tensions over the “no-choice” rule reflect unease with the
unconstitutional wealth-based discrimination that infects the doctrine.
These tensions also open the “no-choice” rule to renewed challenges
from reform advocates. To that end, Part IV offers some practical
strategies for making attorney choice meaningful for all defendants.
IV. STRATEGIES FOR IMPLEMENTATION
The elevation of the Sixth Amendment right to choose an attorney
into the structural error pantheon has drawn relatively little attention.
The implications of that move for improving the meaning and
enforceability of the right to counsel, and in turn for broader criminal
justice reform, depend in part on whether the right to choose remains
exclusively in the hands of the relatively few defendants who can afford
to hire counsel. This Part discusses some practical problems and
responsive strategies related to implementing an inclusive right of
counsel choice for all defendants.
In keeping with precedent defining and limiting the right to choose,
an inclusive counsel-choice rule would mean that all defendants have the
right to choose a lawyer who is qualified, available, and free from
conflicts of interest. As discussed in Sections I.A and II.A, those courtimposed restrictions on the right to choose answer major practical
objections to an inclusive right to counsel choice that applies to all
defendants. Those court-imposed restrictions do so in part by allowing
judges to prioritize efficient resolution of cases and court dockets. No
defendant has the right to choose a lawyer whom the court properly

394. See Mason, 480 F. App’x at 335.
395. Id.
396. Rivera-Corona, 618 F.3d at 979–81 (citing Bland v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr., 20 F.3d 1469 (9th
Cir. 1994)).
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deems to be unqualified, unavailable, or tainted by a conflict of
interest. 397
Moreover, criminal legal systems have already operationalized
processes for matching defendants with attorneys. 398 An inclusive right
of counsel choice simply puts that machinery into the hands of the
people who have the strongest interest in securing quality representation.
Those are the people who face criminal charges, a disproportionate
number of whom are poor people and people of color.
It also is important to note that, on the Richter scale of disruptions to
indigent defense service systems, a Supreme Court decision
constitutionalizing counsel choice for all defendants would be orders of
magnitude below rulings that imposed unfunded mandates. Examples of
such seismic shifts include Argersinger v. Hamlin, 399 which requires
state-supported representation for misdemeanor charges that could result
in jail time, 400 and Padilla v. Kentucky, 401 which demands that already
overloaded and overworked defenders counsel clients on the
immigration consequences of convictions. 402
In addition, as discussed in Part I, an inclusive right to choose can
force greater transparency and accountability from defender systems.
Currently, a significant information deficit regarding attorney
performance in the United States undermines capacities for informed
choice of counsel. 403 It is unclear whether this information deficit is
more or less significant in the civil or the criminal setting, or whether in
the criminal setting there are different types and levels of information
available regarding public defenders versus private defense counsel. It is
clear, however, that the information deficit extends beyond clients
seeking service.
397.
398.
399.
400.

See supra sections I.A and II.A.
Lefstein, supra note 90, at 873; see also Schulhofer, supra note 91, at 547.
407 U.S. 25 (1972).
Id.; see also ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE
TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2009), https://www.nacdl.org/
WorkArea/DownloadAsset.aspx?id=20808 [https://perma.cc/5ZG3-WWEF] (discussing system
overload); Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2012) (same).
401. 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
402. Padilla, 559 U.S. 356; see also Andres Benach, Sejal Zota & Maria Navarro, How Much to
Advise: What Are the Requirements of Padilla v. Kentucky, American Bar Association Section on
Litigation Annual Conference (May 24–26 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/content/
dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/sac2013/sac_2013/18_world_after_padilla_v_kentucky.
authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/FV89-6VUE] (discussing practitioner “panic” over concerns
that “advising on immigration consequences will be an overwhelming burden in an already complex
job”).
403. See supra section I.D.1.
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For example, a recent U.S. Department of Justice survey revealed that
more than forty percent of responding public defenders admitted their
lack of even moderate familiarity with the American Bar Association’s
Ten Principles of a Public Defense Delivery System, 404 which has been
cited as an “essential guidepost” for evaluating system effectiveness. 405
In addition, for most jurisdictions, data on the existence and enforcement
of standards for attorney qualifications, training, workload, and
performance are difficult to obtain. 406 The information deficit includes
data on the resources necessary to fulfill counsel’s basic duties to
communicate, investigate, and litigate.407 In addition, client-rights
information protocols are rare, and solicitation of client feedback is
almost nonexistent. 408
It also must be conceded that even the British indigent defense
system, which Dean Lefstein cites as a successful attorney-choice
regime, 409 has been rocked by debates over a lack of transparency and
accountability, generally poor service quality, and inattentiveness to the
client’s perspective on those issues. 410 As a result, and over considerable
resistance, a detailed peer-review protocol was introduced while
contracts for service were increasingly channeled toward governmentpaid attorneys competing with private solo practitioners and small
firms. 411 The Ministry of Justice even proposed eliminating attorney
choice for indigent defendants as barristers staged protests against fee
cuts and increased regulation. 412
A robust right of counsel choice for indigent defendants also has
implications for the internal culture of public defense systems. 413 Culture

404. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE ET AL., Survey: Adherence of
Public Defense Providers to ABA Ten Principles (Sept. 2014), http://www.american.edu/
spa/jpo/gideon/upload/Gideon-Issues-Paper-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UE6R-AKC6].
405. Holder, Keynote Address, supra note 94.
406. See supra section I.D.1.
407. See supra section I.D.1.
408. Supra section I.D.1.; see also Campbell et al., supra note 119, at 751–54 (discussing limited
research on client perceptions).
409. Lefstein, supra note 90, at 861, 893–900.
410. National Audit Office, Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General: The Procurement of
Criminal Legal Aid in England and Wales by the Legal Services Commission 6–9 (Nov. 27, 2009).
411. See QASA: Quality Assurance Scheme for Advocates: Criminal Advocacy Evaluation Form
and QASA FAQs (on file with the author).
412. Owen Bowcott, Criminal Barristers Announce Half-Day Refusal to Work in Legal Aid
Protest, GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/law/2013/dec/03/criminalbarristers-action-legal-aid-cuts?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487[https://perma.cc/LW9M-R423].
413. I thank Eve Brensike Primus for raising this concern.
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change in this context is notoriously difficult. 414 Lawyers and offices
may resist demands for increased transparency and accountability that
accompany an expanded right to choose counsel. On the other hand,
expanded choice in many settings will often merely highlight
information about attorney performance, or perceptions of attorney
performance, that is already embedded in local culture and
consciousness. Thus, much will turn on whether lawyers and managers
use that increased transparency to demean and denigrate one another or
to encourage improved performance through strength-based evaluation
and training programs. 415
All of these problems indicate that inclusive choice, standing alone, is
no panacea for the structural ills that beset indigent defense systems. The
counsel-choice experiment in Comal County, Texas, 416 illustrates a key
aspect of the problem. Attorney reimbursements for felony guilty pleas
are fee-capped at $650 in that county. 417 This is so despite the state’s
own workload study, which showed that completing the necessary tasks
before entering guilty pleas in high-level felony cases should take
between nineteen and twenty-six hours. 418
Thus, lawyers who participate in the Comal counsel-choice program
can anticipate reimbursement rates ranging from $19 to $34 per hour.
Those rates are among the lowest in the nation, 419 and could not even
cover “the basic costs of keeping a law practice open in Mississippi in
1990.” 420 Absent significant supplementation through judicial discretion,
conscription, or voluntarism, such fee rates are unlikely to support a
414. See Eve Brensike Primus, Culture as a Structural Problem in Indigent Defense, 100 MINN.
L. REV. 1769 (2016); Jonathan A. Rapping, You Can’t Build on Shaky Ground: Laying the
Foundation for Indigent Defense Reform Through Values-Based Recruitment, Training, and
Mentoring, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 161, 163–64 (2009).
415. See Rapping, supra note 414, at 173–80.
416. See Schulhofer, supra note 91.
417. The Hon. R. Bruce Boyer et al., Order Adopting Local Rules for Appointment of Counsel in
Criminal Cases and Schedule of Fees for Payment of Compensation to Appointed Counsel (Oct. 22,
2013), http://tidc.tamu.edu/IDPlanDocuments/Comal/Comal%20District%20Court%20Attorney%
20Fee%20Schedule.pdf [https://perma.cc/2TDS-J6AZ].
418. Dottie Carmichael et al., Guidelines for Indigent Defense Caseloads: A Report to the Texas
Indigent Defense Commission, TEX. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, App. I-1 (2015),
http://www.tidc.texas.gov/media/31818/150122_weightedcl_final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/NYQ6A7PL].
419. John P. Gross, Gideon at 50: A Three-Part Examination of Indigent Defense in America,
NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS 12–14 (2013), https://www.nacdl.org/gideonat50/
[https://perma.cc/EV5G-V9J9].
420. SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR., Justice Shortchanged: Assigned Counsel Compensation in
Wisconsin 2 (2015), http://sixthamendment.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/6AC_wijusticeshort
changed_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/9NYF-MCXH].

11 - Moore.docx (Do Not Delete)

2016]

THE ANTIDEMOCRATIC SIXTH AMENDMENT

12/20/2016 1:04 PM

1763

counsel-choice program that has both consistently high service quality
and long-term viability.
Responding in detail to such problems is beyond the scope of this
Article. Indeed, the argument presented in this Article assumes that
significant increases in support for indigent defense are improbable.
Nevertheless, some innovative strategies are available that can help
promote informed, meaningful attorney choice for all defendants. By
integrating broad attorney choice with data collection and grassroots
organizing in a participatory defense model, these strategies are further
examples of a democracy-enhancing theory in action.
To that end, a model system for inclusive, meaningful attorney choice
should meet three criteria. First, choice should be informed by relevant
data on jurisdictional compliance with best-practice standards for
indigent defense system structure and attorney qualification, training,
performance, and workloads. Second, attorney choice should include all
qualified lawyers. Every attorney should have a duty to accept cases for
which she is qualified, pursuant to best-practice standards, without
regard to client income, in some measure that is related to the percentage
of practice devoted to criminal defense, unless and until attorney
workload and investigative resources reach limits established by bestpractice standards. 421 Third, judges should follow the lead of the
Missouri and Florida court systems by working toward dismissal of
cases that exceed workload and resource limits, in reverse-triage order
beginning with minor misdemeanors. 422
The latter two criteria are likely to spark controversy. Comprehensive
discussion of possible objections is beyond the scope of this paper.
Before turning to the less controversial matter of improved data access,
however, it is important to note that conscripting qualified private
counsel does more than reinvigorate a constitutional root meaning, 423
and reverse triage does more than clear dockets.
To be sure, some lawyers who are qualified to handle particular cases
will respond to conscription by exiting the field or reducing quality of
service. On the other hand, pressing more qualified private lawyers into
421. For citations to comparable scholarly arguments and proposed alternatives, see, e.g., Judith
L. Maute, Changing Conceptions of Lawyers’ Pro Bono Responsibilities: From Chance Noblesse
Oblige to Stated Expectations, 77 TUL. L. REV. 91, 92–93 n.2, 155–57 (2002).
422. See Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1303–09 (discussing Public Defender v. Florida, 115 So.
3d 261 (Fla. 2013) and Pub. Def. Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592 (Mo. 2012)); BORUCHOWITZ
ET AL., supra note 400, at 7 (arguing that the “explosive growth” of misdemeanor cases results in
underrepresented misdemeanants and high tax costs).
423. See supra notes 272–77 and accompanying text (discussing Luis v. United States,
__ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016)).
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indigent defense service will also motivate more attorneys to challenge
resource deficits through policy advocacy and litigation. 424 Indeed, such
challenges are occurring across the country, including in Louisiana,
whose fee-funded system is in a state of near-collapse. 425 Where such
challenges have met with success, defenders and their allies built rich
factual records that document the degradation of the defense function
into a mouthpiece for the prosecutor’s charging and plea decisions. 426
But these cases also raise a number of difficult questions. They
require prosecutors, defenders, and trial judges to cooperate in
winnowing the defense workload down to a manageable burden. How
are these stakeholders to negotiate separation of powers doctrine and
other concerns that affect charging, plea, and diversion decisions? How
will speedy trial rights be protected? Will already-overextended lawyers
be called upon to fill the breach? 427
These are serious questions. Their answers will be shaped through the
continued effort of dedicated reform advocates. As argued elsewhere, 428
one effective strategy is for defenders to embrace their strongest allies in
the struggle for high-quality services: informed, proactive clientele.
Indigent defendants who fully understand their rights and lawyers’
corresponding duties are in a better position to support defense demands
for the time and resources necessary to fulfill those duties.
Optimal information protocols include client-rights information forms
and feedback surveys. 429 Recent empirical research in Hamilton County,
Ohio points to the feasibility of both protocols.430 Indigent defendants
can receive a concise statement of basic components of defense

424. See Simmons v. State Public Defender, 791 N.W.2d 69, 89 (Iowa 2010) (rejecting hard fee
cap as unenforceable due to its “chilling effect” on the right to counsel); id. at 79–82 (discussing
alternate theories sounding contractual equity, due process-takings doctrine, and separation of
powers); cf. ABA CRIM. JUSTICE STANDARDS COMM., ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:
PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES 5-1.2(b) (3d ed.) (1992) (recommending “the active and substantial
participation of the private bar[]” in all indigent defense systems); see also TEN PRINCIPLES, supra
note 93 (“Where the caseload is sufficiently high, the public defense delivery system consists of
both a defender office and the active participation of the private bar.”).
425. Campbell Robertson, In Louisiana, the Poor Lack Legal Defense, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/20/us/in-louisiana-the-poor-lack-legal-defense.html?_r=0
[https://perma.cc/4QBR-5FCX]; David Carroll, Louisiana’s Right to Counsel Problems Explained,
SIXTH AMENDMENT CTR. (Apr. 4, 2016), http://sixthamendment.org/louisianas-right-to-counselproblems-explained/ [https://perma.cc/WNM4-XR8G].
426. See, e.g., Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (W.D. Wash. 2013).
427. See Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1307–09.
428. Id.; see also Campbell et al., supra note 119.
429. See Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1309–15.
430. Campbell et al., supra note 119.
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representation, such as communication and investigation, to which they
have constitutional and regulatory rights. 431 Client feedback surveys
have documented the high priority defendants gave to their relationships
and communication with attorneys. 432 The same empirical evidence,
including data from focus group interviews revealing the serious thought
and consideration that indigent defendants give to these issues, tends to
rebut paternalistic assumptions that poor people charged with crimes
lack the same capacities for self-governance as those who have the
means to hire counsel. 433
To exercise those capacities more fully, defendants can benefit from
new strategies for data collection and assessment pioneered by the Texas
Indigent Defense Commission (TIDC) and the North Carolina Systems
Evaluation Project (NCSEP). TIDC is developing data dashboards that
reveal, for example, local attorney caseloads and reimbursement rates. 434
NCSEP is one of the most advanced national efforts to define and
implement key performance indicators for high-quality defense
service. 435 Examples include core duties to communicate and investigate.
Implementation is underway in several pilot sites. Goals include
increased transparency, accountability, and service quality. 436
Unfortunately, data have limited utility, at least with respect to
sustainable system reform, absent a robust reform-oriented politics.
Therefore, another important strategy for promoting meaningful choice
of counsel for all defendants involves grassroots community organizing.
A promising example is the participatory defense model pioneered by
Silicon Valley DeBug, a small nonprofit in San Jose, California. The
model trains defendants, their families, and their communities on the
rights and duties embodied in the defendant-defender relationship. 437
Participants improve case outcomes by using that training to support
counsel with case investigation and sentencing advocacy. 438 Evidence of
the model’s success include a recent celebration of more than 2,500

431. Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1309–15.
432. Campbell et al., supra note 119.
433. Id.
434. See TEX. INDIGENT DEF. COMM’N, Texas Indigent Defense Data, http://tidc.tamu.edu/
public.net/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/G9PL-PDTW].
435. See N.C. OFFICE OF INDIGENT DEF. SERVS., The North Carolina Systems Evaluation Project,
http://www.ncids.org/Systems%20Evaluation%20Project/SEP%20HomePage.html?c=Research%20
%20and%20%20Reports,%20Systems%20Evaluation%20Project [https://perma.cc/F4PE-67SU].
436. Id.
437. See Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1281–91.
438. Id.
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years transformed from potential time served to “time saved” for
individual defendants through community involvement in their cases. 439
Participants also use the training to drive broader system change through
classic organizing techniques such as public protest and policy
advocacy. Examples of success include the provision of counsel
previously unavailable at key process points such as misdemeanor
arraignment. 440 Thus, the participatory defense movement provides
additional evidence to rebut paternalistic assumptions about the inability
of poor people and people of color to exercise self-governance in the
context of public defense services.
To be sure, even augmented with these and other innovative
strategies, an inclusive right to counsel choice is no cure-all for the
myriad of complex, institutionalized, and interlocking factors that
contribute to hyperincarceration and all its costs, which include the
declining legitimacy of criminal legal systems. Nevertheless, these
strategies do offer practical ways to promote meaningful attorney choice
for all defendants. While an inclusive right to choose counsel can make
no more than an incremental contribution to the struggle for criminal
justice reform, it is a contribution worth making.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court should include poor people in the Sixth
Amendment right to choose counsel. Inclusive choice can force greater
transparency and accountability from defenders and defense systems.
More people exercising more informed choice should increase pressure
to improve representation. Those improvements should trickle up to
raise the Court’s abysmal constitutional standards for attorney
performance. Better defense representation can also help to
counterbalance the concentrated government power that transforms
criminal legal systems into plea mills and debtor prisons. That
recalibration may shore up diminishing cognate rights, such as rights to
discovery and to jury trial. Thus, in the aggregate and over the long term,
inclusive counsel choice can be a mode of grassroots lawmaking that
reshapes the meaning of core constitutional guarantees and strengthens

439. Id. at 1287. The movement subsequently updated that number and celebrated 2,570 years of
time saved. ALBERT COBARRUBIAS JUSTICE PROJECT, 2,570 Years of Time Saved from
Incarceration! (End of 2015 Total) (Dec. 29, 2015), http://acjusticeproject.org/2015/12/29/2570years-of-time-saved-from-incarceration-end-of-2015-total/ [https://perma.cc/M32V-UKZ8].
440. Moore et al., supra note 64, at 1288.
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system quality, fairness, and legitimacy to the point that the term
“criminal justice” is neither oxymoronic nor utopian.

